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## Divisions of the Political Elites and the Making of the Modern Romanian State (1859–1940)

Since the beginning of the 19th century, state and political elites, and foremost intellectuals, played a decisive role as modernizing agents in Romanian modernization and the social reconstruction it brought about. Thus, modern Romanian history may be understood as the history of the rise of elites who compete for self-assertion in a social and economic context, the elements of backwardness which they acknowledge and condemn. The ideological element – and its objectifications in the symbolic sphere – is immanent to all these confrontations, as ammunition used to obtain access to power and its legitimization in the very terms of the dominant cultural categories.

Certainly, since Max Weber encounters between modernization and intellectual development are no longer unfamiliar in the field of social thought. However, less attention has been paid to the *structural ambiguity* of the process of modernization and its paradoxical effects. Given Romanian social conditions and resources, the efficiency of the state-building process was tied to the conservatism of the social order. The same agents that promoted the construction of a modern society also blocked it by refusing a clearly-expressed pro-capitalist and pro-industrial option. They tended instead to celebrate as a compensation of sorts, a rural (and economic) “essence” which would prove to be useful for political mobilization, but not for the foundation of a modern democracy. Consequently, the same factors that contributed to the birth of modern Romania – and implicitly to its Europeanization – worked jointly toward its impairment. The subversion of the parliamentary political system and its civil society generated the conditions for the rise of totalitarian political options.

This is not a typical case of the general “unintended self-limitation” of modernity as addressed by Peter Wagner.<sup>1</sup> The coexistence and adjustment of the principles of liberty and social domestication and control<sup>2</sup> is a cause of mutual limitations and inhibition in this situation as well. Both liberty and social domestication act for the construction of modernity and are grounded in the principle of rationality which establishes at the same time the idea of the autonomy of individuals and groups and that of coercive rigor exerted by the

1 Peter Wagner, *A sociology of modernity. Liberty and discipline* (London: Routledge, 1994).

2 See also Philip S. Gorski, “The Protestant Ethic Revisited: Disciplinary Revolution and State Formation in Holland and Prussia”, *American Journal of Sociology* (September 1993).

authorities. The problem is that in Romania they play against a state of historical backwardness – tantamount to a deficit of anticipatory accumulations or the paucity of social and economic resources capable of setting up the infrastructure of a modern society. Under the conditions of the scarcity of modernizing resources, the historical agents that accomplish the transformation of society are far too preoccupied with the political consolidation of their newly conquered positions to make a place for other social partners.

Indeed, in the absence of a more favorable social structure and a corresponding economic base, the modernization resources were preponderantly institutional, concentrated on the political project of constructing the nation as a means of compensating for the deficits of society.

With these premises taken for granted, this research aims at testing the validity and at establishing the generality of the following statement: As far as the Romanian elites are concerned, political modernization means the transition from a system of domination influenced by a few aristocratic families to a system based on bureaucratic organization and institutional autonomy of the state apparatus. The process is carried out by the same aristocratic elites – and this is the main cause of its tardiness – which quickly learn to convert their old influential positions within the framework of the emerging social and political realities.

The confrontation between aristocracy and the emergent bureaucracy (a new *noblesse d'État* in Pierre Bourdieu's sense) is consequently over two models or types of resource allocation: (1) the landlordship model, which rests upon the existent economic resources and upon the propensity to establish a monopoly of power for those governing the state, and (2) the political model, with resources rooted in the system of hierarchical, more or less dominant positions, occupied by the class of state officials in the institutional structure, which tend to attain their own autonomy and succeeds in imposing its specific logic (*la Raison d'État*) both on their competitors and on the subjects governed.

The basic arguments for this discussion will derive from the empirical reconstruction of the characteristics of the political field as defined by the social traits of its agents. It refers to a population of 488 members of the Romanian governmental teams during the Old Regime Constitutional Monarchy, from the moment considered as the foundation of the modern Romanian statehood (the Union of Romanian Principalities of 1859) until the end of an entire era of parliamentary politics in 1938 (when King Charles II's authoritarian rule inaugurated a long period of totalitarian regimes). In order to reflect the continuity in the actions of some political actors playing a crucial role in the decades preceding Charles II's fatal decision, this work records the historical processes taking place up to 1940, when the war and Ion Antonescu's military dictatorship marked a total break with the previous epoch.

The data used in this research are retrieved from different kinds of biographical and encyclopedic sources (such as dictionaries, biographies and genealogical reconstructions), which are organized here by using standardized

criteria.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the information referring to cabinet members includes: dates of birth and death, region of origin and the region of destination, social origin, social destination, educational path, place of graduation, career, relevant family information (mainly kinship networks), political connections, political affiliation and mobility, parliamentary positions, chronology of participations to governmental teams, and positions held in governments. The upgraded references complete and improve the data used in my previous investigations of the relation between the cultural and the political fields in the 19<sup>th</sup> century<sup>4</sup>. The present study represent an extension of some of the analyses developed there.

### **Elite competition and state formation**

The complex changes occurring in the Romanian Principalities during the 19<sup>th</sup> century result in the apparition of a whole institutional scaffold, which commences the purposeful political effort of the Romanian elites. The process of receiving the status of sovereignty for the Romanian Principalities, – and then independence for the Kingdom, – established for a significant period of

- 3 Here is a list of essential document collections and data sources used for this research: Ion Mamina and Ion Bulei, *Guverne și guvernanți (1866-1916)* [Governments and governors, 1866–1916] (București: SILEX, 1994); Ion Mamina and Ioan Scurtu, *Guverne și guvernanți (1916–1938)* [Governments and governors, 1916–1938], (București: SILEX, 1996); *Dicționarul literaturii române de la origini pînă la 1900* [Dictionary of Romanian literature from the origins until 1900] (București: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1979); Mircea Zăciu, Marian Papahagi, Aurel Sasu eds., *Dicționar de scriitori români* [Dictionary of Romanian writers] (București: Editura Fundației Culturale Române, 1995); Lucian Predescu, *Enciclopedia României. Cugetarea. Material românesc. Oameni și înfăptuiri* [The encyclopedia of Romania. The thought. Romanian material. People and achievements] (București: Cugetarea – Georgescu Delafraș, 1940); Ion Alexandrescu, Ion Bulei, Ion Mamina and Ioan Scurtu, *Partidele politice din România (1862-1994)*. *Enciclopedie* [The political parties in Romania, 1862–1994] (București: Editura Mediaprint, 1995); Mihai Sorin Rădulescu, *Elita liberală românească (1866–1900)* [The liberal Romanian elite, 1866–1900] (București: Editura All, 1998); Mihai Sorin Rădulescu, *Genealogia românească. Istoric și bibliografie* [The Romanian genealogy. History and bibliography] (Brăila: Editura Istros, 2000); Lucian Nastasa, “*Suveranii*” *universităților românești. Mecanisme de selecție și promovare a elitei intelectuale. Profesorii Facultăților de Filosofie și Litere (1864-1948)* [The “sovereigns” of the Romanian universities. Mechanisms of selection and support of the intellectual elite. The professors of the philosophical and philological faculty] (Cluj-Napoca: Limes, 2007); Lucian Nastasa, *Itinerarii spre lumea savantă. Tineri din spațiul românesc la studii în străinătate (1864-1944)* [Itineraries towards the scholarly world. Young people from the Romanian space at studies abroad] (Cluj Napoca: Limes, 2006); Octav-George Lecca, *Familii boierești române. Istorie și genealogie (după izvoare autentice)* [The Romanian boyar families. History and genealogy. After authentic sources], edited by Alexandru Condeescu (București: Libra, f.a.), first edition (București: Minerva, 1899); Mihai Pelin, *Opisul emigrației politice. Destine în 1222 de fișe alcătuite pe baza dosarelor din arhivele Securității* [The transcript of the political emigration. Fates on 1222 index cards based on the dossiers of the Securitate archives] (București: Compania, 2002); Mihai Dim. Sturdza, *Familii boierești din Moldova și Țara Românească - Enciclopedie istorică, genealogică și biografică* [Boyar families from Moldavia and Wallachia. Historical, genealogical, and biographical encyclopedia] (București: Simetria, 2004).
- 4 Marius Lazăr, *Paradoxuri ale modernizării. Elemente pentru o sociologie a elitelor culturale românești* [Paradoxes of modernization. Elements of a sociology of Romanian cultural elites] (Cluj Napoca: Limes, 2002).

time the convergence of cultural and political objectives, the former serving the latter. But the consolidation of the state has also imposed the mobilization of other types of resources adjusted to the realization of more and more specific goals and which thus demanded qualifications until then absent or only incidentally cultivated. Consequently, the state-oriented political commitment of the elite was bound to produce a modernizing effect and the underlying institutional construction, – the much execrated bureaucracy must be understood here rather as resource, – was counterbalanced by very different power trends resisting the change.

The apparition of the state corresponds to the elites' need to keep its own resources under control, in the context where the endless territorial disputes between the European powers were endangering the continuity and stability of any given socioeconomic formation. Within the framework of first the country's long uncontested Ottoman dependence, later the protectorate of the Western powers, and the absence of an internationally recognized status as well as the obligation to provide for foreign troops quartered on the national territory, all this constituted the background of the sovereignty problem of the new Romanian state. The creation of state institutions capable of solving this problem was first and foremost a way of securing the interests of the ruling elites themselves: the economic interests, related to the export of cereals, – and the political interests, affected by the unpredictable dependence on the interplay of the great empires.

A summary chronology of the period under scrutiny points to some basic events: in 1829, a new war in the long series of Russian-Ottoman conflicts ended with a decisive Russian victory and a peace treaty was signed in Adrianopole; as a consequence, the Russians took control of the Romanian provinces, Moldavia and Walachia and set up a political protectorate. The Russian administrative control of the Romanian Principalities was marked by the imposition of the Organic Statute, an attempt to modernize their medieval political and administrative system, perpetuated with some superficial changes through the former Phanariote regimes. This was a regulative document, similar to a constitution, defining the relationship between the Romanian local rulers (*Voivods*) and the aristocratic Assembly (*Sfatul Domnesc*), a quasi-parliamentary institution, including the high clergy and a certain number of representatives of the local aristocracies. The Organic Statute, also defined more clearly the criteria for the recognition of ranks and noble titles and the principles of social hierarchy. As an unintended effect, this stirred up a strong competition for the acquisition of noble ranks. The system functioned in a way which stimulated the ascendant mobility of elements from lower strata, those who would later provide the political competitors of the hitherto dominant old aristocratic families. This political system was challenged and replaced after the Crimean war (1856), when it was the Russians who lost positions against the Western powers. Thus, Moldavia and Wallachia were transferred under the collective patronage of the European powers, a circumstance which favored the acquisition of more autonomy for the provinces and gave rise to the formation of an independent state and the political unification of the two provinces. In 1859, after a long internal electoral struggle and strong support from the European powers, Moldavia and Wallachia became a single political entity under the name of the United Romanian

Principalities and, contrary to European recommendations, elected a single head of state – Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza. He ruled until 1866, when he was dethroned through a political conspiracy and replaced with a member of a German royal family, the future King Charles of Hohenzollern. Anyway, for about three more years after 1859, the two provinces had separate governments, but in 1862 the two administrations were united in Bucharest, which would become the capital of the new state. A long period of balanced political competition between the Liberal and the Conservative parties would be the main marker of internal politics. Externally, still under a formal Ottoman suzerainty, the United Principalities would gain their independence after the new Russian-Ottoman war of 1877–1878, when the Romanians entered the war openly in support of Russia. In 1881, the country became a constitutional monarchy and the former “United Principalities” changed their name to the “Romanian Kingdom.” From then on, a consolidated political system would slowly develop until the First World War when the subsistence of the Romanian state was strongly challenged by the belligerent operations. But after the Treatise of Versailles, Romania actually found itself significantly enlarged, receiving important territories previously held by the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Transylvania and a part of Bukovina) and by the Tsarist Empire (Bessarabia) – acquisitions which would essentially reshape internal politics. Newcomers to the political elite arrived from the new provinces attempting to compete on a wider and unpredictable political scene. The Liberal Party would carry on, the Conservative Party would soon disappear, but a plethora of small populist formations would try to take its place. Hence, the internal and external divisions would eventually lead to the dissolution of the parliamentary system and the end of “old style” politics and would inaugurate a long era of more or less oppressive totalitarian regimes. This period started in 1939, with the authoritarian regime of King Charles II. The pluralist political system was abolished and the political parties were dissolved and replaced with pro-monarchic entities set up to fulfill the King’s ambition to compete with the great dictators ruling at that time in Europe. Then it continued with General Ion Antonescu’s dictatorship during the Second World War from 1940 until 1944, and after a very short interval of a conditional democratic revival, it was followed by two successive communist regimes (under Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Nicolae Ceaușescu), from 1947 until 1989.

The Adrianopole Treaty (1829), with its favorable economic conditions, creates the premises to satisfy these pretensions and simultaneously polarizes the space of political interests. The genesis of the Romanian state is affected by the tension between the founding elites.<sup>5</sup> On the one hand, there were good reasons to build a political entity to ensure the stability and sovereignty – “the internal autonomy” mentioned in the political documents of those times – of the two united regional societies. On the other hand, a structural conflict of sorts was rampant between the interests of the same great aristocracy and the institutional needs of the newly emerging state, which enjoyed limited

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5 An account of the early political factions involved in the process of Romanian State construction can be found in Mihai Cojocaru, *Partida Națională și constituirea statului român (1856–1859)* [The National Party and the establishment of the Romanian state, 1856–1859] (Iași: Editura Universității “Al. I. Cuza”, 1995).

autonomy at first, but was actually deprived of independence and had only precarious resources, incapable as it was to mobilize the largest part of the economic potential held by the great landowners.

From 1829 (the Adrianople Peace Treaty and the introduction of the Organic Statute) and up to the proclamation of the Romanian Kingdom, the accumulating budgetary deficits burden the state finances.<sup>6</sup> The preoccupation with finding supplementary resources and administrative roles to diminish or cover the deficits represents one of the main objectives of state politics and leads to the permanent shift of the balance of forces in Romanian society to the benefit of the administrative staff. The discordance between the surpluses resulting from a positive external trade balance and the continuous accumulation of budgetary deficits expresses the divergences within elite groups related to the allocation of resources. Certainly, in this context, the great nobility – the *protipendada* owning vast domains – was in a safer economic position than the middle nobility and the urban strata, whose incomes and especially whose social ascension depended upon the stability of the country. Still, the relationship between the predicament of internal finances (the allocation of monetary resources as well as the payment of the tribute, its increase or decrease) and the external political transformations was likely to permanently strain the course of internal politics and to impose changes upon it. The obsession of the administrative officials with the collection of taxes went symmetrically against the obsession with the exemption from the tribute – a privilege guaranteed to the aristocracy and granted to others on the condition of rendering special services to the princely house. The system of privileges, as well as the inflation of titles and dignitaries from the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century evince not only the crisis of the system but also a competition in which rank is much more than a simple symbolic recognition of the social estate. Rather, by conferring the exemption from tribute – and, in some cases, administrative influence – it is a source of income if not downright a means of survival for many newcomers members of the political elite.

In time, a conflict of interests appears between this privileged class and the state, where the emergent classes dependent on the positions offered by the modern bureaucracy take the side of the state. As owner of most economic resources, the nobility is reluctant to accept the redress of the budget at its own expense. The fundamental disagreement which accompanies the process of state-consolidation is linked to the positions adopted by the political actors concerning this central conflict of interests, which subsequently structures the formation of a conservative and a liberal pole: the pole of the propertied class, refractory to political reforms which would modify the status of rural property, – and the pole of the reformers, who target modernization via the institution of a central (state) system of controlling resources. These are the elements that lead in time to the formulation of the state interest itself in the terms of the “protection of the national interests”, the “mobilization”, the “constructive effort”, and the “specific model” for the country.

6 See *Enciclopedia României, vol 4: Economia națională. Circulație, distribuție și consum* [The encyclopedia of Romania, vol. 4, The national economy. Circulation, distribution and consumption] (București, 1940), 744- 759.

Thus, the essential opposition around which the field of political positions in the Principalities and the Old Kingdom was originally organized was not, as it used to be abundantly put forth, that between the nobility and the bourgeoisie, but that between the nobility (representing the whole private sphere) and the state bureaucracy.

Throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the tensions in the opinion making Romanian political elite – as reflected in the revolutionary movements of 1848, the disputes around the agrarian question, the customs policies etc. – stem from the political reproduction of the two tendencies: on the one hand, the evasion of the elite in the private sphere, trying to insure and utilize exclusively its own incomes; and on the other hand, – the dependence on the administrative resources offered by the state, which bring about pro-state loyalties and anti-nobility attitudes among those whose ascension is related to the consolidation of the public institutions. The only moment when these two trends were significantly overlapping was the Union of 1859, – the event which actually established the political class of modern Romania.<sup>7</sup>

Moreover, the emerging cluster of intellectuals acquired a key position in the implementation of these transformations. In the period of state-building, this (dominated) segment of the dominant elite<sup>8</sup> (or, more precisely, a sub-elite, gradually and continuously achieving higher elite status) tended to “substitute itself” for the bourgeoisie by taking upon itself – and simultaneously misappropriating itself through speech or deeds – the historical role that this economically active category could have accomplished in the nation building process had it not been permanently disavowed by the same intellectuals – (possessors of the instruments of symbolic domination and legitimation). The Romanian *intelligentsia* persistently attempted to *delegitimize the bourgeois classes* together with the order and the model of the modern Western type society that these classes stood for. In other words, oriented rather towards state-building than towards the construction of the civil society, the intelligentsia tried to impose its own national project by tacitly depreciating the material conditions of the modernizing process, due to its specific means of cultural mobilization.

If we underline the role of intellectuals in inter-elite competition, we must at the same time reflect upon its relation with the bourgeoisie in the process of modernization. Certainly, in the conditions of a primarily rural economy and

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7 For synthetic references about the main transformations within the political field see also Mattei Dogan, *Analiza statistică a „democrației parlamentare” din România* [The statistical analysis of the “parliamentary democracy” in Romania] (București: Editura Partidului Social Democrat, 1946); Ken Jowitt ed. *Social Change in Romania: 1860-1940. A Debate on Development in a European Nation* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978); Apostol Stan, *Putere politică și democrație în România, (1859-1918)* [Political power and democracy in Romania, 1859-1918] (București: Editura Albatros, 1995); Ion Scurtu and Ion Bulei, *Democrația la români, 1866-1938* [Democracy at the Romanians, 1866-1938] (București: Humanitas, 1990); Catherine Durandin, *Discurs politic și modernizare în România, secolele XIX-XX* [Political discourse and modernization in Romanian, nineteenth and twentieth centuries] (Cluj Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2001).

8 As argued in Pierre Bourdieu, *La Distinction. Critique sociale du jugement* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1977); see also Pierre Bourdieu, *La noblesse d'Etat. Grandes écoles et esprit de corps* (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1989).

retarded industrialization, a development generating marked contrasts between the rural and the urban worlds, – the profile of the native Romanian bourgeoisie appeared to be utterly different from that of its classic European prototypes. When referring to the Romanian bourgeoisie, we must distinguish between the extension of the capitalist *relations* under the influence of the economic expansion of the Western markets – (relations in which all the social strata are progressively involved but each of them to a different extent and driven by purposes which do not necessarily pertain to the system of market economy – ) and the bourgeoisie proper, i.e., a social segment professionalized in obtaining benefits from the specialized utilization of this particular type of relations. Mistaking one of these aspects for the other leads either to a hyper-optimistic evaluation of Romanian capitalism<sup>9</sup>– or to the ideological incrimination of a capitalism inexistent in the form in which it is criticized, as it happens in official Marxist discourse.

The quasi-absence of the industrial nucleus from the economic profile<sup>10</sup> of the Romanian Principalities and their long-drawn preponderantly agrarian model which keeps them wedged in a semi-colonial status<sup>11</sup> are some of the causes fostering the speculative capital to the detriment of the productive one. This explains the partial public legitimacy enjoyed by social categories resistant to modernization, among them the old landowning nobility, remaining largely influential in the rural world and some segments of the intelligentsia.

As a socioeconomic bracket capable of forming a common class profile, the Romanian bourgeoisie succeeded only too late in occupying the dominant economic positions, since the sphere of productive activities which it was promoting was only an annex to or an extension of agriculture, and the bourgeois presence was mostly manifest in the commercial and service spheres. Thus, the emergent bourgeoisie – by which we mean that category whose incomes derive from non-agricultural activities and exclusive of landowners who, in their turn, may be owners of industrial establishments – is rather a “service-class” whose main task is to re-circulate and to redistribute an already existing fund of liquid assets and products to the creation of which it contributes only indirectly.<sup>12</sup> This highlights once more, in the system of Romanian societal hierarchies, the economic, social, and political dependency of the bourgeoisie on the dominant social categories, namely, those monopolizing collective resources and the decision-making power in matters political.

9 Ștefan Zeletin, *Burghezia română. Originea și rolul ei istoric*, [The Romanian bourgeoisie. Its origins and its historical role] 2nd edition (București: Humanitas, 1991).

10 See Cătălin Turluc, “Elita economică în România la sfârșitul secolului XIX și începutul secolului XX. Rolul industriașilor evrei”, [The economic elite in Romanian at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. The role of Jewish industrialists], *Xenopoliana* IV (1996): 1–4.

11 See Daniel Chirot, *Social Change in a Peripheral Society. The creation of a Balkan Colony* (New York: Academic Press, 1976).

12 On the heterogeneity of the incipient Romanian bourgeoisie of 19<sup>th</sup> Century, see Alexandru-Florin Platon, *Geneza burgheziei în Principatele Române (a doua jumătate a secolului al XVIII-lea – prima jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea)* [The genesis of the bourgeoisie in the Romanian principalities, from the second half of the eighteenth century until the mid-nineteenth century] (Iași: Editura Universității “Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, 1997).

However, this proves neither that the bourgeoisie as such would not have been historically attested, nor that it occupied a socially ex-centric or “deviant” position. When reconsidering the field of confrontation between different segments of the Romanian society of those times, the distinction between the intellectual and the non-intellectual categories of the middle class should take precedence over other elements. The excentricity of the bourgeoisie manifests itself in relation to the centers of power where the intellectuals successfully claim some positions by supplementing the lack of other resources with their symbolic power and disciplinary discourse. Moreover, the populist and nationalist appeal build up the cultural content of a particular type of social contract established by the ruling Romanian elites with society at large. The competition between the intellectual and the bourgeois categories is specific to the clusters aspiring to gain access to the centres of crucial socio-political decisions and thus acquire positions leading to the improvement of their social standing.

### **The political and cultural fields. Social mobility and educational effect**

In this context, the structuration of an autonomous cultural field is synchronous with the modernization of the political field. Both these domains gradually professionalize and it is thus that, at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, neither politics nor culture look like or keep the same functions as in, for instance, 1848. If the transformation of the political field followed the course of an institutional evolution, reflecting the need to conserve the dominant positions of those invested with power by forcing them to adopt a co-optive conduct, the autonomy of the cultural field would be gained especially by the recognition of its “residual” nature in relation to the political playground and its dependence upon the latter. Moreover, until the complete structuration of the cultural field – occurring towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century – most developments within this field point to frustrations and failed expectations.

In the present exposé I will attempt an empirical reconstruction of the two fields based on prosopographical data of “certified” members of the Romanian political leadership and cultural elite. The sources used here concentrate synthetically factual, verified information on all personalities that have populated the Romanian political and cultural world since the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century until the First World War.

The starting point consists of the construction of a statistical database valid for the 19<sup>th</sup> century elites. The database merges various personal kinds of information from the first part of Mamina, Bulei, and Scurtu’s work on government members<sup>13</sup> with that from *The dictionary of Romanian literature from the origins until 1900*, elaborated by scholars affiliated with the Institute of Linguistics, Literary History, and Folklore at the “Al. I. Cuza” University of Iași (1979).<sup>14</sup> The information collected refers to 683 individuals: 193 government members (i.e., ministers from the Romanian governments from the period 1859–1918) and 490 writers belonging to the same generations (almost all, with two exceptions only, born after 1800). Bringing together all

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13 See note 3.

14 I.d.

these data allows further re-categorizations since each source is comprised of references to individuals belonging to both of these groups.

For methodological reasons, the personalities in question are thus conventionally distributed into two classes: One class, includes those of the *political field* (294 cases), those having occupied political or administrative positions in Romanian public life (that is, members of Parliament, political leaders, or those having shared governmental responsibilities) who were belonging or independent of the cultural sphere. The other class consists of those active within the *cultural field* proper who were not involved in the political field (389 cases), that is, poets, prose writers, historians, philologists, journalists, translators, critics, etc.<sup>15</sup> Another grouping criterion is the generational one. In order to grasp the main tendencies of these changes, the whole population under scrutiny is divided into two generational groups, those born before 1840 (inclusive) and those born after 1840, resulting in two subpopulations of close to identical dimensions (360 and 322 individuals respectively).

The analysis on the following section focuses on positions within the social structure and the chances of social achievement of participants in the two groups compared. The questions for which we will try to provide an answer are as follows: *What are the chances that an individual coming from the lower class will succeed in occupying a position in the higher class? What are the chances for that individual to occupy a function in the political field? How does education condition such ascension? Once reaching the higher class, how are the individuals distributed in the field of ruling elites? Are there any differences in time, that is, from one generation to another regarding the probabilities of success in the social, political, and cultural field?*

The trends of differentiation and evolution of the groups concerned are traced by the statistical study of a few classic nominal variables as listed below in abbreviated notations, applying as restrictive categories as possible to ensure the significance of the main differentiations considered.

**Statistical variables applied in the analysis:**

1. 'Soc. Orig.' = Social origin (father's social position). Nominal categories:  
1. upper classes; 2. middle classes; 3. lower classes.
2. 'Status' = Social destination (highest social status). Nominal categories:  
1. upper classes; 2. middle classes; 3. lower classes.
3. 'Studies' = Educational level; Nominal categories: 1. academic degrees;  
2. undergraduate academic studies without degrees; 3. without university education.
4. 'Field' = Belonging to the cultural or political field. Nominal categories:  
1. the cultural field; 2. the political field

15 This data arrangement ignores the individuals belonging to both fields – cultural and political. In fact, the overlapping group was assimilated to that of the politicians, because its members share the same social traits as participants of the political field and the cultural activity (or the lack of cultural activity) did not introduce any difference regarding the social ascension of members of the political field. Instead, there are important differences between men active in cultural activities and not being politically involved and the politicians themselves.

5. 'Polit. Capit.' = Species of political capital. Nominal categories: 1. without political capital; 2. historical capital; 3. transactional capital
6. 'Generations' = historical generations. Nominal categories: 1. born before 1840; 2. born after 1840

The Table 1 sets forth the divisions of the population under study in the political and cultural fields according to the above mentioned variables. The study of their interaction through multivariate analysis (especially when the variable "Field" is taken into account as a dependent variable) can thus reveal the type of interaction established between these factors introduced in the analysis, in turn, as an independent (explanatory variable) or test-variable.

**Table 1. Divisions of Romanian elites in the 19<sup>th</sup> century by selected social and demographic characteristics and main fields of activity**

		Cultural field	Political field	Total	numbers
Social origin	Missing data	58.9	41.1	100.0	175
	Upper class	26.7	73.3	100.0	161
	Middle class	56.5	43.5	100.0	193
	Lower class	87.0	13.0	100.0	154
Status	Missing data	66.7	33.3	100.0	6
	Upper class	31.3	68.8	100.0	368
	Middle class	86.6	13.4	100.0	283
	Lower class	96.2	3.8	100.0	26
Studies	Missing data	77.8	22.2	100.0	27
	Degrees	49.2	50.8	100.0	266
	University studies without Degree	60.5	39.5	100.0	157
	No univ. Studies	60.9	39.1	100.0	233
Political capital	Historic	28.4	71.6	100.0	201
	Transactional	2.6	97.4	100.0	116
	No political capital	89.9	10.1	100.0	366
	Total	57.0	43.0	100.0	683
Generations	<1840	42.9	57.1	100.0	361
	>1840	72.7	27.3	100.0	322
	Total	57.0	43.0	100.0	683

A brief examination of the data from the Table 1 indicates an unequal distribution of the chances of appearing in the two classes of activity political and cultural and also displays some interesting effects of such positions on various sociodemographic characteristics:

- a. First of all there is, not unexpectedly, a strong influence of *social origins*, which makes access to the political field largely dependent on membership in the higher social strata. Excluding those without known

- origin, it can be observed that the highest chances in this respect are held by the subjects whose parents belong to the upper classes (including the landowning aristocracy, dignitaries, and high rank military officers). With the lower social origin, these chances diminish and seem to push the public actors concerned toward the cultural field.
- b. There is also a *status effect* which functions similarly and further conditions access to the political field by belonging to the upper classes. The percentage of the individuals belonging to the lower classes and acquiring a political position is much lower than among those with middle or upper class background, which suggests that the ascensional motivation among the lower and middle classes is directed mostly to the cultural field.
  - c. *The educational effect* is also highlighted. Even if advanced education does not seem to direct the subjects into a field to the same extent as the variables of social positioning (upper social origin and higher status), the holding of academic degrees (equivalent to bachelor and doctorates) does the chances of insertion into the political field increase considerably.
  - d. An even more important distribution factor is acquired political capital. We distinguish here among two species of political capital, *historical capital and transactional capital*, and we will explain their functionality later on. The obvious insight from this table is that, as predicted, there is a strong relation between the availability of political capital and the chances of entering the field of political decision making.
  - e. Finally, the generational distribution in the two categories is marked by a *historical effect* which diminishes, in time, the absolute numbers and the percentages expressing the individual chances of access to the political field. For the population under study, the proportion of those involved in politics decreases against those of the cultural field, and we might suppose that this brings about an intensification of competition in politics proper.

Comparing now the political and the cultural fields, one must take into account the social stakes reflected in these patterns of differentiation. Table 2 points out the existence of different class structures in the two fields of elite activities. The social origins of those involved in cultural activities are more modest than those of politicians, whether or not the latter are involved in cultural activities as well. The great proportion of sons of priests, craftsmen, and other modest urban employees and peasants about a third of the cultural producers of the 19<sup>th</sup> century contrasts with the marked aristocratic origins of government members: a third of them originate in the dominant classes and about 15% in the middle or lower nobility. Another striking aspect derives from the low proportions of those with intellectual background or with bourgeois origins proper (that is, sons of entrepreneurs, and not only sons of intellectuals from the bourgeois classes, such as jurists, lawyers, medical doctors, or representatives of the liberal professions). This is a clear symptom of an incipient stage of the “intellectualization” of the elite, when the mechanisms of self-reproduction, which allow the intergenerational

transmission of the tricks of the trade and the *esprit de corps*, do not yet function.<sup>16</sup>

**Table 2. Social origins and destinations of the 19<sup>th</sup> century elites**

Social class categories	Socio-professional positions	cultural field (%)		Political field (%)	
		Social Origin	Social Destination	Social Origin	Social Destination
Upper (Elites)	Aristocracy	8.2	8.8	34.4	21.7
	Dignitaries	1.3	6.8	4.1	56.2
	Intellectual Elites	1.5	14.3	1.7	9.0
Upper middle	Mid./lower nobility	11.8	3.6	13.9	1.7
	Entrepreneurs	6.2	2.3	7.8	1.4
	Jurists, doctors, engineers	5.4	11.4	3.1	6.2
Lower middle	Secondary Teachers	0.5	20.0	0.7	1.4
	Journalists	0.5	15.3	0.0	1.7
	Artists	0.5	4.9	0.0	0.0
	Clerks, officers	3.1	6.0	2.4	0.3
Upper lower	Priests	11.3	3.6	3.4	0.3
	Teachers	1.8	2.6	0.3	0.0

16 Still, we must take into consideration the great proportion of those in the studied population whose social origin could not be clarified, due to the scarcity of documentation identified by the authors of our source books. The lacunae give evidence of the precariousness of the information on whole categories of government members or writers – especially when they come from non-aristocratic environments, as well as the discretion of the subjects themselves, most frequently intellectuals of higher or middle status. Indeed, academics, teachers, journalists, and artists often, when appropriate, omit to disclose their modest social origin, out of fear, perhaps, of a loss social standing. The low proportion of those with bourgeois origin can also be explained by propensities of dissimulation. Areas such as background could be regarded as “impure” or “illegitimate” by those authorized to manage the collective memory: administrative reporters, historiographers, cultural historians, and critics. Numerous bibliographical lists or references do not completely document the social provenance of the intelligentsia, and this lack is abundantly compensated by the detailed information related to education. Undoubtedly, meritocratic ideology is one of the elements that largely explain this phenomenon, since it makes school socialization into the true starting point of the intellectual biography, substituting the “non-noble” origins by intellectual references and genealogies to which a similar role of “status provision” is attributed. But the actual importance of social provenance is precisely strengthened by the attempt to blur it. Moving beyond these nuances, the social origin clearly appears as an important factor which orients the subjects preferentially towards the cultural or the political clusters of the elite. The chances to occupy positions in the political field rise when the parents enjoy a more privileged status (Table 1).

*Divisions of the Political Elites*

Lower lower	Urban popular classes	10.5	0.3	1.7	0.0
	Peasants	10.8	0.0	1.4	0.0
	Missing data	26.5	0.0	25.2	0.0
Total		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N =		389	389	294	294

If we look at the data on social destinations, the configuration of the probabilities observed clearly appear to favor the upper classes: 86.9% of the members of the political class are part of the elites. In the cultural field, the greatest part of the subjects, 63.6%, belong to the middle class, which is a segment constituted only up to a small percentage, 6%, by the lower and middle nobility and by the economic bourgeoisie. The rest comprises diverse intellectual categories: secondary school teachers (20%), journalists (15.3%), those active in the “liberal professions” (jurists, doctors, but also a few engineers – 11.4%), actors and artists, and clerks and lower officers.

The lower classes, mainly priests and primary school teachers, are poorly represented in both fields. Culture and politics are the domains of competition between the different segments of the upper and middle classes considered together, and members of the lower classes are excluded from the game. Higher social standing with its symbolic benefits are mostly gained at the upper levels and this is precisely why the improvement in the position of descendants of priests or teachers, but also in those of craftsmen or peasants appears to be a motivational element which finally influences the whole configuration of the elite.

**Table 3. Patterns of social mobility in the cultural and political fields of Romanian elites in the 19<sup>th</sup> century**

Social Dest. > Origin	The cultural field				The political field			
	Elites	Middle Classes	Lower Classes	Total	Elites	Middle Classes	Lower Classes	Total
Counts								
Missing data	24	71	5	100	57	12	0	69
Elites	31	12	0	43	114	4	0	118
Middle classes	27	78	3	108	67	16	0	83
Lower Classes	33	84	17	134	15	4	1	20
Total	115	245	25	385	253	36	1	290
Row %								
Missing data	24.0	71.0	5.0	100.0	82.6	17.4	0.0	100.0
Elites	72.1	27.9	.0	100.0	96.6	3.4	0.0	100.0
Middle classes	25.0	72.2	2.8	100.0	80.7	19.3	0.0	100.0
Lower Classes	24.6	62.7	12.7	100.0	75.0	20.0	5.0	100.0
Total	29.9	63.6	6.5	100.0	87.2	12.4	0.3	100.0

A sizable measure of ascendant social mobility is noticeable for significant proportions of participants in the two fields of activity. This is undisputedly a symptom of the radical transformations of the society as a whole and not only of its elites, which is visible through the significant intergenerational status changes for all the categories distinguished. But for each of these strata, the mobility bears distinctive features.

On preliminary examination of the figures which associate the inherited status of each subject with the highest status attained during his carrier (Table 3), it can be noticed that on the diagonals indicating the proportions of immobility – 44.2% for the cultural field and 59.3% for the political field – the proportion of immobile individuals is greater among the subjects from the political field and originating in the upper classes than among their counterparts in the cultural field: 114 of the 131 immobile subjects come from the upper class (which is 87%). Conversely, in the cultural field, members with middle-class origins tend to be those who preserve their inherited positions (there are 78 immobile middle-class members out of the total of 126 – that is 61.9%).

The ascendant mobility seems to be extremely marked for those of lower class background, while for the subjects coming from the upper classes the preservation of the status is an obvious stake. In the political field, the change of status by those from the middle classes entering the category of the elites is spectacular: 80.7% of them achieve an improved status, while for the same category in the cultural field the probability of such a promotion is more modest (25%). Equally pronounced is the political ascension of those originating in the lower categories: in the political field, 75% of them move up directly to the upper classes while in the cultural field most of them stop at the level of the middle classes.

These apparently acrobatic leaps from the lower to the upper classes depend less on the endogenous relations of the social groups in question, and more on exogenous structural modifications. Therefore, let us keep in mind the fact that the data pertain only to a tiny segment of 19<sup>th</sup> century Romanian society in one of the most dynamic moments of its existence. More precisely, the data provide information on the very process of the formation of the bureaucratic elites – characteristic of the modern parliamentary state – and the readjustments of power relationships between an old aristocratic elite and a new elite absorbing previously inferior social segments and, accordingly, a matrix of mobility of both structural (linked to socioeconomic development) and forced nature (following shifts in the ruling staff). In consequence, the ruling strata are less permeable than they might seem at first glance. Its members are less inclined to change their position than constrained to occupy certain positions either via their absorption in the upper classes – the case of those from the middle and lower classes – or by the conversion of their initial social capital into administrative positions and posts of political influence. The “downgraded” are few, being less frequent in the cultural field where several boyars move down the class system. The term itself bears different meanings for each groups: most often, it is associated with the pursuit of an intellectual or journalistic profession in the case of the cultural producers, or with the practice of a profession in the judiciary or magistracy, contiguous to the administrative field, in the case of the politicians.

It can thus be said that the cultural and political fields are distinct areas that regroup the members of the elite according to criteria of social status: the differences between them disclose the oppositions between the preponderantly intellectual middle class with administrative functions and aspirations, as well as with frustrations or claims specific to the social segments of origin. Membership in one of these groups also depends on the limits imposed by the social condition and education on the level of aspirations and possibilities of social ascension. *Hence, the opposition between the two fields reflects different levels of distribution of chances of access to the dominant social positions, and, at the same time, the manner in which assets of power and influence are redistributed among the dominant and the dominated sectors of the upper and middle classes. These categories exerting control over the whole society.* If by intellectuals we generally mean social actors engaged chiefly in the cultural field, then Pierre Bourdieu's definition of it as a *dominated segment of the dominant class*<sup>17</sup> is also confirmed in the case of the Romanian elites of the period under study.

In order to find out to what extent the above observed relations also mutually condition each other and what consequences derive from these interferences, we will analyze them in turn in the framework of their variability. For the moment we can lay out their aggregated effect by using the "homogeneity analysis", a statistical method indicating the main trends of concentration of those individuals bearing the characteristics captured by all the five variables mobilized above, which is a variant of the correspondence analysis for sets of nominal variables.

17 Pierre Bourdieu, *La distinction*.

**Table 4. Romania's elite members by main fields of activity and generations as well as by their status, academic degrees and political capital (1866–1918)**

Political Capital	Studies and status	Field insertion, by generations born before or after 1840				Total	
		Cultural, b.<1840	Cultural, b.>1840	Political, b.<1840	Political, b.>1840	%	N=
<b>Historical Capital</b>	Elites with diplomas	12.5		82.5	5.0	100.0	40
	Elites without diplomas	10.6		85.1	4.3	100.0	47
	Elites with inferior education	15.7		78.4	5.9	100.0	51
	Middle class with diplomas	30.8	23.1	30.8	15.4	100.0	13
	Middle class without diplomas	44.4	22.2	27.8	5.6	100.0	18
	Middle class with inferior education	50.0	20.0	30.0		100.0	20
	Lower class with inferior education	50.0		50.0		100.0	2
	Total	21.5	5.8	67.5	5.2	100.0	191
<b>Transactional Capital</b>	Elites with diplomas			27.1	72.9	100.0	70
	Elites without diplomas		5.9	52.9	41.2	100.0	17
	Elites with inferior education			81.8	18.2	100.0	11
	Middle class with diplomas		8.3	41.7	50.0	100.0	12
	Middle class without diplomas			100.0		100.0	1
	Middle class with inferior education		33.3	33.3	33.3	100.0	3
	Total		2.6	38.6	58.8	100.0	114


***Divisions of the Political Elites***

<b>Without Political capital</b>	Elites with diplomas	22.2	61.9	4.8	11.1	100.0	63
	Elites without diplomas	38.5	30.8	26.9	3.8	100.0	26
	Elites with inferior education	33.3	27.8	36.1	2.8	100.0	36
	Middle class with diplomas	20.6	75.0	1.5	2.9	100.0	68
	Middle class without diplomas	22.8	75.4	1.8		100.0	57
	Middle class with inferior education	41.9	58.1			100.0	74
	Lower class without diplomas	33.3	66.7			100.0	3
	Lower class with inferior education	35.0	65.0			100.0	20
<b>TOTAL</b>		29.4	60.2	7.2	3.2	100.0	347

The projection of all the attributes that they determine in a space of proximities and distances allows us to grasp the whole arrangement and the structural tendencies of this population (Figures 1 and 2). The diagram reunites the variables expressing the status and the studies (precisely because the association of the two noted) thus obtaining a new hierarchical classification and the generational groups together with the field grouping, in order to delimit the variation of statuses within these groups. Table 4 displays this reconstruction and the “unfolded” distribution of the attributes on which the homogeneity classes are based.

The diagrams of homogeneity obtained through the projection of the subjects’ characteristics (“attributes”) on three dimensions must be read according to the polarizations at the extremities of the axes. Hence, the attributes with opposing values on the same axis, which are expressed by opposing algebraic signs, configure opposing ordering tendencies in the field; the values grouped around the center of the diagram (which is the value 0) indicate those attributes which do not quite differentiate the subjects according to a specific dimension.

Political and cultural elites. Status, studies and field insertion




**Figure 1. The homogeneity analysis. The first two analytical dimensions: generations and field of insertion**

The first two axes of the figure divide the space of attributes into three groups. The space of the sociocultural attributes of the population under study is organized according to the membership of participants in predominantly the political or the cultural field (first dimension) and in different generations (second dimension) as shown in Figure 1. It can be thus observed that the cultural field (situated on the right side of the reference line which crosses the first axis' 0 point) regroups those who occupy positions within the lower and middle classes who are non-graduates but university, or lower, educated. The political field, situated on the left side of the same line reunites the elites, i.e., the members of the upper classes, independently of the educational level. The first axis simultaneously distinguishes the social positions: the tendency of the political field to coagulate the relations within the dominant classes, by attracting the elites of both generations is obvious.

The second axis distinguishes the generations and, as a consequence, marks the evolution of the intellectual profile of the elites at the same time. For the older generations participation in the political field is given by the possession of a high social status and academic diplomas do not function as “visas” securing the access into the field. Still, for the newer generation, having a university degree is an important condition of promotion into the elite. Over time, the political elites gain more intellectuals via the integration of those with academic titles. This “intellectualization” is not achieved, however, by those positioned in the lower or middle classes. This development confirms the persistent prevalence of the status effect upon which the ascension to dominating political positions relies.

Political and cultural elites. Status, studies, and field insertion



**Figure 2. The homogeneity analysis. The transformations of the cultural field and field insertion**

The second dimension also distinguishes between the two types of capital which grant access to the political field: the “historical capital” (characteristic of the first generations of politicians surveyed) and the “transactional capital” (proper to the newer generations). The two species of political capital are associated with the rising importance of the intellectual assets (“intellectualization”). In time, the recruiting system based on “historical capital” and an inherited dominant position within the social hierarchy is replaced by a system where the social position is associated with personally acquired competences (as attested by academic degrees) and with abilities of political negotiation, manipulation, and transaction.

The supplementary information brought in by the third dimension (Figure 2) indicates the distinctions between the socio-cultural attributes of participants of the cultural field – which divide the population following criteria of higher studies, the possession of degrees, membership in the newer generations – as opposed to those of the older generations with less advanced studies. The transformation seems significant for the middle classes: at this level we can observe an “intellectualization” analogous to that observed among those of initial elite status but without the promise of dominating political positions. The generational change proves that, over time, the differences between the cultural and the political field bring into prominence a class effect. While the “intellectualization” can, in principle, secure a high position, for those originating from the inferior classes, the positions can be limited to the cultural field, since the access to the political field is also conditioned by the (preferably initial) membership in the dominant classes. The only exception from the rule concerns the access to political positions of the middle-class descendents possessing at the same time university degrees, instrumental in their subsequent assimilation in the upper class.

Political and cultural elites. Status, studies and field insertion




Figure 3. The homogeneity analysis. The transformations of the cultural field and the generational change

Figure 3 brings into the analysis a new and important element: the proximity of the attributes of the second generation in the cultural field and those of the first generation in the political field – all of them being situated on the same side of the reference line separating the sectors of the third dimension. The similitude is obvious especially for the non-graduate members of the middle classes having accomplished university studies: in the case of the older generation, the certified intellectuals are to be found in the political field, while in the next generation they tend to enter the cultural field. There is a clear shift here with a transformation of the function of university degrees, the social achievement being dependent upon graduation of university or post-university studies.

By corroborating with other data, the conclusion of this preliminary analysis will be later confirmed: *the cultural field subsequently reproduces the models of ascension specific to the political field, while the autonomized political field itself modifies its recruitment pattern in order to conserve the advantages of domination and the differentiation.* This is why, in the newer generation, the possessors of academic degrees among those of middle class background occupy within the cultural field a place analogous to the positions held by the older generations within the political field. *The delayed homology* of the two fields is the reason why the cultural achievement has a strong symbolic stake, with even a specific function in support of political success in the former cohorts.


### 3. The political field. A bird's-eye view

The first impression we have in the historical review of the attributes of the studied governments is related to instability. During a period of only 82 years under scrutiny, not less than 98 governmental teams succeed one another – more than one a year, on average. There was also a rotation of 488 politicians in 1297 ministerial portfolios. The frequent changes of government are accompanied by the multiplication of portfolios held by the same persons (accumulation of positions), but also by numerous replacements within the same cabinet. All this resulted in the increase of the total number of ministerial positions occupied temporarily up to 1792. This is why a politician's carrier comprises an average of 3 or 4 portfolios held in various governments. Still, the high rate of intergovernmental circulation is associated with a high rate of governmental reshuffling, that is frequent discontinuities in the assignment of functions assumed by the same politicians: more than 87% of the ministers were appointed at least two times during their carrier and 65% of them were members of a cabinet at least 4 times. This state of affairs suggests a small but very tumultuous world, where, at least in the first decades, political battles were fought by roughly the same actors, each of them knowing the others very well, both when they were in opposition or in alliance, contributing to the refinement of the strategies employed in the political game as well as to the precipitation of its denouement.

Governmental instability is greater between 1859 and 1870, the period of the administrative unification of Moldavia and Walachia under the rule of Alexander John Cuza (1859–1866) and during the political confrontations generated by Charles I Hohenzollern's installment on the Romanian throne (1866–1870).<sup>18</sup> During all this time, there are few governments remaining in office for more than a year and the average of 2–3 changes of government per year (see the graph below) reflects the climate of contestation and political struggle, opposing the ruler and a legislative body elected on census based suffrage, the latter being numerically dominated by the great landowners generally hostile to reforms. After Cuza's abdication, these tensions are added to an anti-dynastic tendency instrumentalized by the radical Liberals. This conflict culminates in the crisis of Charles' rule, in 1870, who, on the point of renouncing the throne, forces the negotiation of a new political pact between the main political actors – the liberal groups (constituting a party in 1875) and the conservative bloc (forming a party in 1880). Consequently, Lascăr Catargiu's conservative government (1871–1876) inaugurates a steadier epoch of relative governmental stability, where the conservative and liberal governments succeed one another according to a "rotation" pact arbitrated by the monarch almost until Romania's entry into the First World War.

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18 Paul E. Michelson, *Romanian Politics: 1859–1871. From Prince Cuza to Prince Carol* (Iași-Oxford: The Center for Romanian Studies, 1998).



**Figure 4. Governmental instability: Average number of cabinets per year in Romania (1859–1940)**

The years of 1916–1920 are decisive for the complete reconfiguration of the political spectrum, if we judge by the eight governments from this period, reflecting the passage to another electoral regime. Accordingly, at the end of the war, Romania practically became a new country, whose territory (the provinces of the “Old Kingdom”) was enlarged by the incorporation of Transylvania, a sector of Hungary’s Partium and Banat, Bessarabia, and Bukovina. These regions had a predominantly Romanian population but also important ethnic minorities (Hungarians, Germans, Ukrainians, Russians, Jews), which brought up new stakes and new issues in Romanian politics. The abolition of the great landed estates as an effect of the land reform (1923) lead to the disappearance of the landlords’ class and, implicitly, of its representative, the Conservative Party, which was almost wiped out of the political scene. The new Constitution of 1923, guaranteeing universal suffrage, consecrated the passage to a new way of doing politics, based on mass parties, placing the National Liberal Party in the center of the political game and driving a plethora of newly born right- and left-wing parties to attempt to undermine this central position. Among these, the most important are: People’s Party (1918–1938), a populist party led by general Ion Averescu; the Romanian National Party (1881–1926) of the Transylvanian nationalists having militated for Transylvania’s incorporation in Romania (first enthusiastically welcomed by greater Romania’s electorate in 1919 but heavily “macerated” later in the political machinery of Bucharest so as to be dissolved into other formations); the National Peasant Party (1926–1947), a left-wing party born from the fusion of the Peasant Party (1918–1926), led by the rural teacher Ion Mihalache, with the Romanian National Party; the National Christian Party (1935–1938), a right-wing party organized around the Transylvanian poet Octavian Goga and the anti-Semitic ideologist A. C. Cuza; and the Party “Everything for the Country” (1927–1941), the new denomination of the “Legion of the Archangel Michael” (or the “Iron Guard”), a far right fascist and anti-Semitic formation, responsible for the climate of political violence which marked the whole interwar period. The institution of Charles II’s authoritarian monarchical regime in 1938 resulted in restrictions imposed upon the activity

of the parliamentary parties and in the ultimate dissolution of most of them within the Front of National Rebirth, in the framework of a single party regime subordinated to the policies of the royal house. These changes initiate the instauration of Ion Antonescu's military dictatorship which completely eliminates any party activity.

A significant aspect in this analysis refers to the political mobility of government members measured by the total number of cumulated positions in different political formations that each minister has joined along his carrier. Table 5 displays this movement in the form of an *affiliation matrix*,<sup>19</sup> which is in fact a matrix of proximities and distances between parties stemming from the overlapping political memberships.

Looking at the political evolution of the ministerial cluster and particularly at the inter-party transfers (see Table 5) some additional observations can be made. To begin with, the stability of the liberal pole is noteworthy since its foundation in 1875 until the instauration of the royal dictatorship. The Liberals are the most numerous and the least inclined to change their options except for at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when a few Liberals joined the Conservatives. Until 1916, the governmental rotation system with alternating Liberal and Conservative governments provides a certain political stability, whose results allowed the internal consolidation of the state institutions.

However, concerning foreign affairs, it is important to mention the opposition between the French and the Central-European (Austrian and German) spheres of interests in which Romania was trapped even before 1916. This works as a stimulant for a subsequent nationally oriented reshuffling of foreign policy, with a progressive stress laid on the independence from the great powers. The Romanian politicians and government members – the great majority of which were educated within the orbit of French cultural and political influence – were hence obliged to take up à *contre-coeur* a new political course in response to strong diplomatic pressures exerted by the Central Powers. In those times, Romania was militarily and politically integrated in the Triple Alliance.

Conversely, after World War I, the Romanian political body was effervescently searching for alternatives able to undermine the dominance of the National Liberal Party and achieved temporary successes. They benefited first the Romanian National Party and (Averescu's) People's Party immediately after the war only leading to the right-wing oriented metamorphoses of the political stage which converged to openly anti-liberal options, which can be regarded as anti-modernizing options.

Although interesting and predictable, the political evolution of the former Transylvanian nationalist leaders has been given little scholarly attention. When sticking to their initial choice and joining the Peasant Party (thus forming the National Peasant Party) they also remained faithful to their initial democratic options. Nevertheless, nationalism pushed some of these militants toward the populist or radical right-wing parties such as, at first, the People's Party and then the National Agrarian Party (led by Goga and Cuza) – and finally (Goga's) National Christian Party. The alternative to liberalism was formulated

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19 In the meaning defined in Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

in terms of populist-nationalist options, since the democratic left played a minor role in these shifts of balance of forces. This political system finally undermines itself: drawn apart by the lack of alternatives to an unavoidable modernization and incapable of waiving the short term benefits of demagogic popularity, the Romanian political class contributed to its own disappearance. The crushing blow delivered to Romanian political life by Charles's regime occurred with the complicity of an important segment of the politicians – those having outspokenly traditionalist, anti-Semitic, and authoritarian options. The failure of the political class was due to its failure to openly embrace the project of modernity, including industrialization and urbanization and its refusal to pay the price for coquetting with totalitarian solutions.

**Table 5. The affiliation matrix. Main political orientation and inter-party migrations of members of Romanian governments between 1859 and 1940**

	Political orientation	Political orientation (overlapping affiliations)													
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1	“National Party” (“Partida Nationala”) (till 1859)	32	14	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	Conservative Party – and affiliates (1880-1925)	14	197	31	9	5	6	5	7	5	3	3	4	0	16
3	National Liberal Party – and affiliates (1875-1947)	4	31	101	13	1	1	11	2	7	2	1	2	0	3
4	National Romanian Party of Transylvania (1881–1926)	0	9	13	53	2	0	15	1	28	3	7	5	0	13
5	Other regional parties from the joint provinces after 1918	0	5	1	2	16	1	7	9	6	0	2	2	0	3
6	Social-Democrats, Communist, Left wing radicals	0	6	1	0	1	11	2	3	5	1	1	1	0	3
7	People’s Party (gen. Averescu – 1918–1938)	0	5	11	15	7	2	51	3	9	3	17	14	0	9
8	Peasant Party (1918–1926)	0	7	2	1	9	3	3	27	20	3	2	2	0	7

*Divisions of the Political Elites*

9	National Peasant Party (1926–1947)	0	5	7	28	6	5	9	20	70	3	2	1	0	26
10	Agrarian Party (1929–1938)	0	3	2	3	0	1	3	3	3	11	0	0	0	5
11	National Agrarian Party (1932–1935)	0	3	1	7	2	1	17	2	2	0	21	18	0	5
12	National Christian Party (1935–1938)	0	4	2	5	2	1	14	2	1	0	18	27	1	6
13	Archangel Michael's Legion (fascists – 1927–1941)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	7	0
14	Charles II supportive political factions (1938–1940)	0	16	3	13	3	3	9	7	26	5	5	6	0	55

The issue of access to the political field raises the question of the individual resources of political, social, and personal nature which favor the insertion in one of the fields of activity of the ruling elite. In other words, it raises the question of the *political capital on which the success and the carrier rest upon*. In this sense, the trajectories of the ruling elite members shed light upon the functioning of two types of political resources corresponding to two different types of available capital: *the historical and the transactional capital*.

The first type derives from the participation in the foundation activities of the nation state and from the solidarity networks they created among its protagonists of the political field. It is an effect of the rupture occurring within the historical continuity of the former regime, and the political movement that imposed essential reversals of earlier connections and power relations. The second type – which does not rely on spectacular reversals of established hierarchies, but on the recognition of technical-organizational competences valuable for the development of political life and the art of administration and on activities carried out inside a stable political organization and within an established regime – follows a strategy of “small steps” associated with a “piecemeal work” in political carrier building.

In respect to the processes of accumulation and the uses of the two sorts of “capital”, the historical capital is typical of the “expropriation” of the power positions of the established traditional elites by means of a radical change of regime, be that violent or not, with immediate consequences. The transactional capital pertains to the slow, progressive accumulation of carrier resources, in the context of the gradual professionalization and rationalization of the administration of public authority and power whereby transactions, exchanges, strategic games, and the involved intellectual resources play an ever increasing role.

The historical capital legitimizes self-esteem and political self-assertion in terms of previous glory and merit, a charisma of sorts put to the test in crucial

confrontational moments or at least on the strength of membership in a group which succeeded in imposing itself. The transactional capital relies upon legitimization in the terms of the “management” of social relations, power and the whole political-bureaucratic environment. The historical capital is an outcome of a historic rupture while the transactional capital a consequence of administrative and political continuities. The first requires a sociological inquiry of conflictual interactions and exclusions; the latter a sociological inquiry of consensus and integration. The historical capital’s credit derives from previous presumptively heroic acts. Conversely, the transactional capital stems from the accumulation of routine gestures and activities.

The historical capital is a component which characterizes especially the periods following the seizure of power. It is a situation of the “change of the guard”, hence the echo of this “heroic” moment fades out in time. Thus, “the personal history” of many of those joining the cultural or the political field indicates their participation in political and the historical events that have become hallmarks in the collective memory of the national building process: the revolution of 1848, the Union of 1859, Al. Ioan Cuza’s deposition, the War of Independence of 1877. It can be said that the history of the Romanian political class is intermingled with the history of these epochal events<sup>20</sup>.

**Table 6. The Main Periods of Romanian Political History and the Availability of the Two Species of Political Capital in the Ruling Elite**

Main Historical Periods		Species of Political Capital			Total
		Historical	Transactional	Without political capital	%
Separate governments under Al. I. Cuza rule	Moldavia 1859–1862	78.9	5.3	15.8	100.0
	Wallachia 1859–1862	82.4	14.7	2.9	100.0
United Governments under Al. I. Cuza rule	1862–1866	52.4	33.3	14.3	100.0
United Principalities – Carol the 1st	1866–1871	59.1	31.8	9.1	100.0
	1871–1881	41.2	58.8		100.0

20 But this can also be looked at from the opposite angle: only those events are epochal which lead to a certain political configuration where the winners impose their own history, once their domination is secured. As a significant sequence of events, the history of the nation is a “history” of the “narration”. It is organized according to a teleological principle which orients its narrative and conveys a meaning resulting from the projection on the past of the political confrontations already settled conclusively. It is the history of the winners of the present, and those who evaluate it – a history in which, one must admit, there is only a small place for the losers and for the justification of positions that they defended. The temporal sequence thus reconstructed is a self-legitimizing history; it also provides for the protagonists having lived it a pretext for the mythical reiteration of a moment which, by these very means, becomes ontologically ‘foundational’: the present appears as a causal consequence of this legendary past – while, in fact, the past itself is just an “instrumentalized” invention of the present. It thus establishes a public discourse particularly emotionally loaded and whose implicit references are necessarily added to a “sacred story.”

Constitutional Monarchy	1881–1891	31.6	63.2	5.3	100.0
	1891–1900	22.2	77.8		100.0
	1900–1910	13.3	86.7		100.0
	1910–1916	25.0	75.0		100.0
	1916–1919	54.0	38.0	8.0	100.0
	1920–1930	45.0	55.0		100.0
	1930–1938	35.4	58.3	6.3	100.0
Authoritarian Monarchy	1938–1940	24.0	42.0	34.0	100.0
Total		44.7	47.0	8.3	100.0

The analysis of Table 6 actually highlights a process in which the recruitment criteria of government members shift from those endowed with “historical capital” – a preference which especially manifest in the period before 1880 and immediately after the First World War – to those endowed with “transactional capital” during politically more stabilized periods. Historical capital is associated as a rule to political battles in strenuous conditions, while transactional capital is connected to routinized activities carried out within the limits of bureaucratic practices. The long term transition from historical to transactional political capital is no doubt related to the ageing of the “founding” generations, but it expresses at the same time an internal, independent development within the power field, consisting in a reorientation of elite careers toward the acquisition of qualities consonant with the need to render the administrative practice more efficient. Through the presence of highly skilled possessors of academic degrees, the political field becomes “technicized” and professionalized, thus acquiring an internal rationality which makes it significantly distinct – even if not definitively – from the “external” type of politics, based mostly on the construction and cultivation of the public image of the ruling elite.

#### **4. The political field and the typology of government members**

The homogeneity analysis (Multiple Correspondence Analysis for categorical data<sup>21</sup>) realized exclusively for the group of government members (using the data for the 488 ministers of the period from 1866 to 1938) points to an internal dynamic capable of casting light upon some general features of the cluster which governed the autonomization and professionalization of the political field.

First, the analysis was enriched with a supplementary set of descriptive variables clumped together in order to integrate various significant information concerning:

- basic demographic attributes (generation, rural or urban origin, province of origin, the period of the first recruitment in a cabinet – all subjects being males);

21 Multiple Correspondence, Version 1.0, by *Data Theory Scaling System Group (DTSS)*, Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences. Leiden University, The Netherlands.

- social attributes (social origin, highest social position, kin relationship with other political actors);
- education (level of education measured by the highest degree, the educational profile, the place of acquisition of the highest certificate);
- types of political capital accumulated;
- political affiliations.

Five relevant dimensions<sup>22</sup> expressing the main patterns of association between the variables mentioned above were considered relevant for picturing the field of oppositions among social attributes of the Romanian cabinet members (as described in figures 1, 2, and 3). In short, they offer a glimpse into the main historical transformations of the political field towards professionalization and yield fruitful suggestions for the interpretation of the whole process.

Thus, the first dimension – (*Historical dynamics*) correlates the main social and political trends since the foundation of the Romanian state and until the first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century. Hence, it opposes the aristocracy ruling in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the lower class intellectuals (especially the sons of priests, teachers, peasants – or those of obscure origin) that entered the last governments under scrutiny. At the same time, it reveals the gradual democratization and bureaucratization of the political field and the access to ruling positions of categories with poor social background but with high educational skills. As Bourdieu observes for the social field in France in the 20<sup>th</sup> century,<sup>23</sup> the structure of this kind of opposition is a *chiasm*; on the one hand, it reflects the paradoxical asymmetry between the social and economic capital of the aristocratic elites lacking educational degrees in the early 1800’s, and, on the other hand, the cultural capital of the new “meritocratic” elites of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, owners of certified competences in the 1930’s and 1940’s. In the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, the successors of the old *boyar* families had a secure social position and a promising political future but did not have the motivation to obtain educational degrees. Thus they at times acquired, during prolonged stays in (mostly) French institutions of elite training, a good but miscellaneous (not specialized) education. Family relations and political networks would complement this cultural background, which proved very helpful for those younger descendents of the nobility who compensated the positional losses of their parents by working for the diplomatic services of the new nation state. Indeed, over time, the more the old gentry lost its positions in the ever more technocratic governmental teams, the more their offspring found a good livelihood in embassies and departments of foreign affairs. In contrast, the lower-class newcomers (of quite often rural origin) in the elite

22 Here is the model summary for the multiple correspondence analysis for the five dimensions extracted:


Dimension	Cronbach’s Alpha Total (Eigenvalue)	Variance Accounted For	
		Inertia	Total (Eigenvalue)
1	,847	4,938	,290
2	,770	3,635	,214
3	,728	3,172	,187
4	,645	2,546	,150
5	,556	2,097	,123
Total		16,388	,964
Mean	,738(a)	3,278	,193

23 Pierre Bourdieu, *La Distinction*.

used their educational capital as a substitute for nobility (they often became academics as well) and as a tool for ascendant mobility. Apparently, such self-made politicians, less sustained by hegemonic family networks, were also more attracted by populist and nationalist movements (the People's Party, the National Peasant Party, or the National Christian Party) in their efforts to adjust to the new mass-party orientation of the post World War I years.

In terms of regional distribution, there are contrasts mainly between the profiles of the old generation of Moldavian and Wallachian politicians and the newcomers from the provinces attached to Romania after 1918. Thus, the first dimension reflects the reconfiguration of the relationship between center and periphery after WWI and the strongly distinctive traits of those who came from Transylvania, Bukovina, and Bessarabia. The latter were educated in Budapest, Vienna, Cluj, or Chernowitz and tried to impose at first a rather Central European style of political action.


The second dimension (*Military vs. Political Elite*) is in opposition to the technocratic administrative segment (composed of highly educated and highly skilled lawyers, economists, diplomats, managers, or academics) as the military elite, that is, officers recruited in governmental teams. Not surprisingly, this also reflects an opposition between political activism, strategic networking, and the formal political neutrality required from the military body. It additionally expresses the disparity between the owners of transactional capital and those who lack any political capital.



**Figure 5: The first two dimensions are projections for the variables describing the social attributes of Romanian Government members between 1859 and 1940.**

The third dimension (*Regional oppositions between the Center and the provinces*) differentiates between the members of cabinet coming from Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bukovina and those from Wallachia, a region which, significantly, tends to monopolize the recruitment of the military elite. This might be an important clue in explaining Wallachia's political dominance after the Union of 1859 and Bucharest's centralizing policy. In this interpretation, the opposition between possessors of technical or entrepreneurial skills, educated abroad (in France, mostly), and the less educated segment (including aristocratic autodidacts) expresses the capital's propensity to concentrate the recruitment of the state technocracy and, also, the decline and marginalization of the nobility in the outgoing 20<sup>th</sup> century. The latter would, over time, transfer some of its former influence to the Foreign Affairs.

The fourth dimension (*Generational shift in political options in the interwar period*) describes the gradual drift of the government to the extreme right during the interwar period. This process includes the gradual replacement of the old generations of politicians – Liberals, Conservatives or Transylvanian unionists alike – by representatives of populist, nationalist and anti-Semitic movements, or by the new technocrats that have been recruited as politically neutral experts in the administration of Charles II's authoritarian regime. Retrospectively, it is highly astonishing how Transylvanian politicians, with their strong democratic traditions in the Parliament of Hungary, could join and reinforce anti-Semitic and anti-democratic political forces such as Goga or Cuza's parties. In fact, Iuliu Maniu's political project (National Peasant Party) included a sort of democratic self-defens of the political institutions, but other partners coming from the National Romanian Party of Transylvania (like Vaida Voievod) as well as some representatives of the newer generations of Transylvanian politicians became increasingly sensitive to the anti-parliamentary trends of the interwar times.



**Figure 6. The projections for the third and fourth dimensions of the variables describing the social attributes of the Romanian Governmental elites between 1859 and 1940**



dethroned Prince Cuza. Integrated in conspiratorial (Freemasonry or other secret societies) or kinship networks inside and outside the political class the group of the aristocrats appears as a corporate cluster, since they have common interests and act together, even if their ideological options are equally oriented toward conservatism and liberalism. But these political orientations are often shifting and the political interests are reconsidered for the purpose of re-launching carriers. Finally, a trend discernible for some significant members of this group seems to reveal something important about a certain class' drift; starting as a political liberal and ending as a conservative. Therefore, the social capital converted into political transactions tends to be the main instrument of preserving the social status and political hegemony of an old ruling class for whom family membership and kinship connections remained for centuries the first and ultimate principle of personal and social life. Thus, for this governmental section, public politics emerge as a complex kind of extended algebra of family affairs and continues to be used as an instrument for managing long term kinship strategies; a motivation more powerful than any provisional, or even historically loaded, circumstance. We should not ignore that history itself is appropriated in its substance by particular family histories. The family strategies and the kinship logic function as a generator of obligations, social rules, and interdependencies that secures the existence of the aristocracy as an autonomous trans-generational entity. They oblige individuals to win or to give up their personalized wishes of salvation and condemn the aristocrats to live or die, like dinosaurs, all together, instead of looking for any possible individual escape. This is the most influential of the leading groups, having controlled about one third of positions of prime-minister of all governments.

**Table 7. The typology of the cabinet members of Romanian governments between 1859 and 1940, by periods of first recruitment (raw percentages)**

First recruitment into a governmental team	Typology of cabinet members						Total	
	„Historical elite”	„Transactional elite”	Military Elite	Unionists from the new provinces	National Peasant Party experts and technocrats	Technocrats of the last decade & Charles the 2nd's supporters	%	N
1859–1865	88.7	5.2	6.2				100.0	97
1866–1870	45.5	27.3	27.3				100.0	22
1871–1895	9.6	65.4	25.0				100.0	52
1896–1916		90.2	9.8				100.0	41
1918–1925		39.3	14.6	41.6		4.5	100.0	89
1926–1935		34.3	10.1	3.0	45.5	7.1	100.0	99
1936–1940		4.5	11.4	2.3	9.1	72.7	100.0	88
Total	20.7	31.8	12.7	8.6	10.9	15.4	100.0	488

2. *The transactional elite of the historical parties* is the numerous group of politicians born mostly after 1840, mainly Liberals and Conservatives, holding the kind of political capital labeled here as “transactional.” They operate all along the period chiefly as party activists and build their carrier merely by day to day negotiations and by strategic actions within the political class. As in the previous group, some are appointed in a government as Liberals, and shift to Conservatism later in the carrier. The transactional elite is the political successor of the historical elite of the two “Old Kingdom” provinces (Wallachia and Moldavia) and comes into politics mainly in the interval between 1871–1935. Two thirds of them are Wallachians originating from the middle classes and are integrated (either by kinship or by the political connections) in the interpersonal networks of the political class. Most of them have a PhD or BA degree in law, acquired mostly in France or Bucharest, and occupy their political positions as higher state officials, lawyers, or university professors.
3. The members of the *military elite* form a different body of dignitaries. Most of them are not involved in everyday political confrontations and in the web of informal ties cultivated by the other clusters. They are mostly co-opted as war ministers in different governments. However, about a quarter of them belong to the Liberal party and some of them become prime ministers or initiators of political parties, like general Ion Averescu, the founder of People’s Party. The biographical data are scarce for this segment, but we know that most of the military elite comes

from Wallachia and have completed superior military education. The “historical capital”, i.e., their aura as war heroes in 1877, 1913, 1918, seems to be a decisive criterion for their selection as ministers.

4. *The Unionists from the new provinces*: Active politicians before 1918 in Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bukovina, were mostly key actors in the process of unification of the Romanian state, and they constituted a category of government members that were given a warm welcome in the first governments following the end of the First World War. After 1918, they received as a reward positions such as Minister of State or Minister without portfolio. This was not only a sign of symbolic acknowledgment of their merits as local agents of the unification – or as a strategic way to provide a political legitimation to the postwar territorial acquisitions until the implementation of its international recognition by the Paris Peace Conference – but also a means of placing the new regions (still unintegrated administratively) under Bucharest’s centralizing control. The most prominent positions in this segment were held by Transylvanians whose political initiatives at the end of the war led to the creation of a provisory government (the Ruling Council of Transylvania, 1918–1920). This allowed for the administrative control of this region recently detached from Austria-Hungary and then to obtain the best electoral score in the elections of 1919. Following this turn they formed an ephemeral government under the leadership of Alexandru Vaida Voevod, the vice-president of the National Romanian Party of Transylvania. The Unionists, as possessors of a symbolic capital that almost all the subsequent governing parties coveted, always had a part to play in the political and image building governmental strategies in the first postwar decade, but they were assigned mostly decorative posts. Their social profile is also different from that of other clusters: it is in this group that we find the greatest share of priests’, teachers’, or peasants’ sons, almost always with university diplomas, a fact illustrating the essentially intellectual character of this “self-made” elite, as was the Romanian leading strata of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Educated in Vienna, Budapest, or in the German environment, and accumulating degrees in medicine, sciences, and agronomy – in addition to diplomas in law, philosophy or philology – they display a cultural profile different from other political elite clusters of the Old Kingdom. Their political culture is also particular since it is the product of the democratic competition within the Austro-Hungarian national movements and political environment, much more strictly formalized than that of the Principalities. These conditions rather delayed their adaptation to the new Romanian framework. However, it is interesting that the inevitable dissolution of the former political platforms (the regional nationalist parties), which propelled them to the center of Romanian political life, directed their options mainly toward the Liberals or to parties with populist profiles (People’s Party) and, to a lesser extent, toward the National Peasant Party (which resulted from the fusion of the Romanian National Party with the Peasant Party).

5. The experts and technocrats of the National Peasant Party include the newer generations of Transylvanian political actors together with an important segment of politicians born in the Old Kingdom (especially Wallachians), whose governmental debuts take place after 1925. Having a social profile somewhat similar to that of the Unionists, they distinguish themselves by the large proportion (87%) of those with doctorates obtained in the universities of Central Europe and (more recently) Transylvania proper (almost half of them also occupying university positions). They represent an important body of specialists in law and economy, and occupy most of the technical ministerial positions, such as those of finances, agriculture, commerce industry or work, and social welfare. They gravitate politically toward the National Peasant Party (64%) and an important proportion of them is constituted of former members of the Romanian National Party (42%). This is a generation expressing the accommodation of the Transylvanian elite to Bucharest's politics, even if a great part of this group does not transfer all its activities to the capital. The model of the politician that they illustrate indicates the progressively marked shift towards the pattern of competent and influential technocrats joining politics. This is precisely why some of them were also recruited into the "governments of experts" during the royal dictatorship.
6. The last type of government members, *the technocrats of the last decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> century* and Charles II's supporters: this brings together the ministers of the last cabinets of the parliamentary period (1936–1940) and the high state officials without political affiliation, recruited as experts in the governments of the authoritarian rule introduced by King Charles II. As graduates of the universities of Bucharest (for the most part) or France, these technocrats appear as a historical substitute of the category of the "transactional elite." In a sense, the technocratization of the administrative elite in the mid 1930's is analogous to the process which, before 1918, obliged the ruling strata to a measure of political professionalism. However, the category's success rests less upon its networks of interpersonal relations and political recruitment, and more on their particular competences at the service of a state, the administration of which necessitates an increasing need of technical and administrative know-how.

## 5. Conclusions

The conclusions of this account of the stakes and mechanisms of competition for positions in the elite will specifically draw upon the political aspects of this problem area. The phenomenon of state power is essentially ambivalent. Far from being reducible to the "monopoly of the means of legitimate coercion", as Weber put it<sup>24</sup>, the public power game implies, in addition to coercion and the

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24 Max Weber, *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, vol. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

imposition of rules upon society, the management of rewards and mechanisms of influence and the co-optation of those invested with power.

In the case of Romania, in the period from 1859 to 1916, both of these dimensions come into play: First, the allocative dimension refers to the confrontation relative to the control of the material and human resources available in the country by the great landowners, represented by the aristocracy of old stock or, alternatively, by the state officials; Second, the co-optation dimension refers to the incorporation into the governing elites of (preponderantly intellectual) categories capable of a more efficient exercise of governmental prerogatives and the accession of some middle-class categories – other than the entrepreneurs – to the aristocratic stratum. The explanation of this alliance between the government members and the emergent “state nobility”, composed mostly of jurists and intellectuals rests not as much upon the absence of a “middle class” or a national bourgeoisie – an absence proven by nothing besides ideological discourses. Rather, it rests upon the mechanisms of reproduction of positions occupied by the dominant categories’ and on the aristocracy’s new strategies of adaptation to the process of modernization of Romanian society and its institutions, whereby state-building becomes the most dynamic factor of social modernization itself. To conclude, the resources mobilized in Romania in the modernization process were rather institutional than economic.

These resources also advance the professionalization of activities in the political field, and its evolution toward a regime of co-optation and transaction, in search of continuity and the conversion of aristocratic privileges into positions securing the economic and political control of public resources. This leads to the emergence of at least two governing elite clusters whose profiles no longer resemble those of the previous periods: the aristocracy, holding bureaucratic positions, and the newcomers in the administration of the state, whose origins are often in the upper classes but who are co-opted according to the criterion of political-administrative utility. This last group gives birth to the new bureaucratic elite, the members of which are complementary to each other rather than competitive by nature. In time, this is reflected by the shift from the symbolic type of power legitimization, based on membership in or connection to the aristocratic circle of rulers, to a “legal-rational” legitimization characteristic of the new administrative elites. This also relates to the alternative positions that the intellectuals (as social actors specialized in the production of discourses on power legitimization) occupy through this process, which utterly changes (and strengthens) the public functions assumed by the intellectuals themselves. The autonomization (and then the estrangement and aloofness of a cultural field as against the political field) is a symptom of those changes, as well as the substitution, within the field of administration proper, of “social capital” (the assets gained from social origin or high class connections), by technical and organizational qualifications. Thus, modernization means the transition from a domination system based on the personalized networks of members of the ruling classes to an impersonal and bureaucratized system, where inherited status and influence are less important than administrative efficiency and the capacity to accomplish prescribed institutional functions.

**ANNEXE**

**Social Profile and Types of The Romanian Cabinet Members between 1859-1940**

(Extended presentation of the typology resulted by clustering the dimensional scores of the attributes of the Government members)

		Typology of cabinet members						
		Old Moldavian and Wallachian aristocracy (Historical elites)	Transactional elite of the historical parties	Military Elite	Unionists from the new provinces (after 1918)	Experts and technocrats of the National Peasant Party (after 1926)	Technocrats of the last decay & Charles the 2nd's supporters	Total
Epoch	1859–1917	100.0	52.9	46.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	43.4
	1918–1940	0.0	47.1	53.2	100.0	100.0	100.0	56.6
Generations - born between	1789–1820	57.4	1.9	6.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	13.3
	1821–1840	42.6	16.8	32.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.2
	1841–1860	0.0	31.0	9.7	0.0	0.0	1.3	11.3
	1861–1880	0.0	31.6	35.5	78.6	18.9	9.3	24.8
	1881–1890	0.0	13.5	14.5	21.4	56.6	58.7	23.2
	1891–1906	0.0	5.2	1.6	0.0	24.5	30.7	9.2
Period of the first recruitment into a governmental team	1859–1865	85.1	3.2	9.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	19.9
	1866–1870	9.9	3.9	9.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.5
	1871–1895	5.0	21.9	21.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.7
	1896–1916	0.0	23.9	6.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.4
	1918–1925	0.0	22.6	21.0	88.1	0.0	5.3	18.2
	1926–1935	0.0	21.9	16.1	7.1	84.9	9.3	20.3
Rural vs urban origin	Rural	9.9	12.3	21.0	69.0	60.4	32.0	26.0
	Urban	64.4	85.8	61.3	21.4	37.7	49.3	61.9
Province of birth	Wallachia	43.6	67.7	58.1	11.9	22.6	48.0	48.8
	Moldavia	45.5	28.4	25.8	9.5	7.5	17.3	26.0
	Transylvania	2.0	0.6	3.2	47.6	58.5	12.0	13.3
	Bukovine	2.0	0.0	0.0	11.9	1.9	0.0	1.6
	Bessarabia	0.0	0.0	1.6	19.0	3.8	4.0	2.9
	Abroad	3.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	3.8	2.7	1.8

Province of destination	Bucharest	55.4	78.1	90.3	45.2	47.2	84.0	69.7
	Wallachia	1.0	5.2	0.0	4.8	5.7	2.7	3.3
	Moldavia	40.6	13.5	6.5	2.4	3.8	1.3	14.3
	Transylvania	0.0	1.3	0.0	23.8	37.7	8.0	7.8
	Bukovine	0.0	0.6	0.0	9.5	0.0	1.3	1.2
	Bessarabia	2.0	1.3	1.6	14.3	5.7	2.7	3.3
Social origin	Abroad	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
	Missing data	8.9	31.0	41.9	23.8	45.3	57.3	32.8
	Aristocracy	61.4	16.1	6.5	14.3	1.9	2.7	20.5
	High officials	0.0	8.4	8.1	2.4	3.8	2.7	4.7
	Middle gentry	18.8	16.8	21.0	0.0	1.9	1.3	12.3
	Entrepreneurs	5.9	10.3	0.0	0.0	5.7	1.3	5.3
	Liberal professions	1.0	7.7	1.6	2.4	7.5	6.7	4.9
	Intellectuals, state officials	1.0	3.9	9.7	4.8	11.3	10.7	5.9
	Priests, teachers	3.0	3.9	6.5	35.7	15.1	2.7	7.8
Peasants, workers	0.0	1.9	3.2	16.7	7.5	14.7	5.5	
Social position	Missing data	3.0	1.3	1.6	0.0	1.9	4.0	2.0
	Aristocracy	63.4	12.3	1.6	11.9	0.0	1.3	18.4
	High officials	21.8	34.8	30.6	31.0	34.0	62.7	35.5
	Higher military officers	2.0	0.0	64.5	2.4	0.0	2.7	9.2
	Academic elite	3.0	20.0	0.0	14.3	41.5	6.7	13.7
	Managers, entrepreneurs	0.0	5.2	0.0	2.4	0.0	8.0	3.1
	Lawyers	3.0	22.6	0.0	19.0	17.0	4.0	11.9
	Intellectuals	1.0	3.9	0.0	19.0	5.7	9.3	5.1
Kinship	Consanguine kinship	31.7	18.7	16.1	2.4	7.5	6.7	16.6
	Kinship by alliance	62.4	38.1	27.4	11.9	20.8	6.7	32.8
	Important kin member outside the ruling group	21.8	5.8	0.0	7.1	1.9	2.7	7.6
	Consanguine ascendants (grandfathers, fathers, uncles)	7.9	4.5	4.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.7
	Consanguine descendants (sons, grandsons, nephews)	3.0	8.4	1.6	0.0	0.0	4.0	4.1
	Siblings – Brothers	10.9	3.9	4.8	2.4	5.7	0.0	4.9
	Siblings - Primary cousins	10.9	1.3	3.2	0.0	1.9	4.0	3.9
	Allied ascendants (grandfathers, uncles)	5.0	5.8	1.6	0.0	1.9	0.0	3.3
	Allied descendants (nephews)	3.0	6.5	4.8	2.4	3.8	0.0	3.9
	Siblings by alliance (brothers in law/ fathers of sons in law)	21.8	8.4	4.8	2.4	3.8	2.7	8.8
	Siblings by alliance (co-lateral cousins, other co-lateral kin members)	23.8	18.7	12.9	4.8	13.2	2.7	14.8

*Divisions of the Political Elites*

Social Capital	Political elite member entourage	18.8	20.6	17.7	11.9	20.8	9.3	17.4
	No kin relations, no entourage	12.9	43.9	54.8	61.9	62.3	78.7	47.7
	Jockey-Club member	25.7	6.5	8.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.4
	"Junimea" Cercle	6.9	5.2	0.0	4.8	0.0	0.0	3.5
	Cultural associations (1830-1850)	13.9	0.6	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3
	Freemasonry	32.7	5.8	11.3	9.5	3.8	2.7	11.7
Education	PhD	11.9	40.0	0.0	45.2	86.8	36.0	34.0
	University Diploma	12.9	43.9	3.2	50.0	13.2	42.7	29.3
	High education without diploma	41.6	14.8	0.0	2.4	0.0	1.3	13.7
	Military Academy/School	5.9	0.6	93.5	0.0	0.0	6.7	14.3
	Secondary and lower education	1.0	0.0	1.6	0.0	0.0	2.7	0.8
	Self- or home educated	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	3.7
Place of acquiring the highest certificate	Missing data/Education at home	25.7	5.8	12.9	7.1	1.9	24.0	13.3
	Transylvania, Tchernowitz, Budapest, Vienna,	5.9	2.6	8.1	40.5	47.2	12.0	13.5
	Germany	9.9	5.2	6.5	4.8	13.2	9.3	7.8
	Bucharest	4.0	14.2	48.4	14.3	3.8	25.3	17.0
	Elsewhere outside Romania	6.9	5.8	1.6	11.9	5.7	4.0	5.7
	France and Belgium	37.6	45.2	11.3	4.8	13.2	14.7	27.7
	France and Germany	1.0	5.2	0.0	4.8	0.0	0.0	2.3
	Bucharest and France	1.0	13.5	9.7	2.4	9.4	8.0	8.2
Iassy	7.9	2.6	1.6	9.5	5.7	2.7	4.5	
Place of studies	Bucharest	5.0	30.3	61.3	19.0	15.1	41.3	28.1
	Cluj and Transylvania	1.0	0.0	0.0	4.8	26.4	4.0	4.1
	Iassy	8.9	3.2	1.6	9.5	5.7	5.3	5.3
	Tchernowitz	1.0	0.0	0.0	4.8	5.7	0.0	1.2
	Hungary	1.0	0.0	0.0	26.2	22.6	4.0	5.5
	Austria	5.0	2.6	8.1	21.4	20.8	8.0	8.2
	Germany	10.9	11.6	8.1	14.3	17.0	9.3	11.5
	France	42.6	65.2	21.0	14.3	22.6	22.7	39.3
Other place abroad	11.9	9.7	4.8	21.4	13.2	5.3	10.2	

Profile of studies	Theology	3.0	0.0	0.0	9.5	5.7	5.3	2.9
	Law	32.7	76.8	0.0	47.6	64.2	32.0	47.1
	Political_science	3.0	8.4	0.0	4.8	7.5	0.0	4.5
	Philosophy	1.0	11.6	0.0	19.0	11.3	9.3	8.2
	Letters_Arts	2.0	12.9	0.0	21.4	3.8	9.3	8.2
	History	5.9	1.9	0.0	7.1	3.8	1.3	3.1
	Medicine	5.9	4.5	0.0	21.4	7.5	8.0	6.6
	Sciences, Agronomy	1.0	8.4	4.8	14.3	7.5	4.0	6.1
	Economics	5.0	10.3	0.0	2.4	32.1	5.3	8.8
	Engineering_architecture	4.0	7.7	9.7	4.8	0.0	13.3	7.0
Military	4.0	1.9	95.2	2.4	1.9	6.7	15.0	
Species of Political Capital	Historical	75.2	9.0	85.5	73.8	58.5	13.3	44.1
	Transactional	12.9	89.0	6.5	26.2	39.6	52.0	46.3
	No political capital	8.9	1.9	6.5	0.0	1.9	30.7	8.2
Political Capital	1848 Revolutionary	27.7	1.3	3.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.6
	1848 Anti-revolutionary	5.0	0.0	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2
	Union activist in 1859	56.4	2.6	3.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.9
	Anti-Unionist (1859)	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
	Putchist in 1866	17.8	0.6	8.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.9
	Anti-putchist (1866) or anti-dynastic	6.9	1.3	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0
	Against political mainstream (1848-1866)	12.9	1.3	3.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.5
	Active in 1877-78 war	2.0	0.6	32.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.7
	Active in 1913 war	0.0	0.0	17.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3
	Active in 1916-1918 war	0.0	4.5	53.2	19.0	18.9	6.7	12.9
	Member of the Budapest Parliament	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.5	1.9	0.0	1.0
	Union Activist in 1918	0.0	2.6	1.6	66.7	43.4	6.7	12.5
	Member of the Great National Romanian Assembly (1918)	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.8	3.8	2.7	1.2
	Alba Iulia Assembly delegate	0.0	0.0	0.0	26.2	24.5	0.0	4.9
	Member of the Transylvanian Provisional Government (Consiliul Dirigent, 1918-1920)	0.0	0.0	0.0	21.4	20.8	0.0	4.1
	National Romanian Council	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.1	3.8	0.0	1.0
Foreign affair lobbyist	11.9	9.7	0.0	7.1	3.8	4.0	7.2	

***Divisions of the Political Elites***

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Political affiliation when joining first cabinet	No data/No affiliation	12.9	3.2	64.5	4.8	11.3	41.3	19.9
	"National Party" ("Partida Nationala")	13.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.9
	Conservatives	26.7	29.0	4.8	16.7	0.0	0.0	16.8
	Liberals	44.6	54.8	21.0	14.3	9.4	12.0	33.4
	National Romanian Party/Other regional parties from the joint provinces after 1918	0.0	0.0	0.0	42.9	5.7	0.0	4.3
	People's Party/P. Poporului	0.0	5.8	4.8	19.0	1.9	1.3	4.5
	National Peasant Party/Peasant Party	0.0	3.2	4.8	0.0	60.4	6.7	9.2
	National Christian Party /other nationalists	0.0	1.9	0.0	2.4	11.3	18.7	4.9
	Archangel Michael's League (fasciste)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.3	1.4
	National Rebirth Front	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.0	1.2
	Diplomats (Politically unaffiliated )	2.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.7	1.4

Cummu- lated political affiliation	No political affiliation/ no data	11.9	1.9	51.6	4.8	3.8	40.0	16.6
	"National Party" ("Partida Nationala") (till 1859)	31.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.6
	National Liberal Party - and affiliates (1875- 1947)	45.5	66.5	25.8	31.0	13.2	16.0	40.4
	Conservative Party - and affiliates (1880- 1925)	29.7	38.7	6.5	14.3	1.9	0.0	20.7
	National Romanian Party of Transylvania (1881-1926)	0.0	7.7	0.0	42.9	41.5	1.3	10.9
	Other regional parties from the joint provinces after 1918	0.0	0.6	0.0	26.2	5.7	1.3	3.3
	Social-Democrats, Communists, Left wing radicals	0.0	3.2	0.0	4.8	5.7	1.3	2.3
	People's Party (gen. Averescu - 1918-1938)	0.0	10.3	11.3	38.1	11.3	8.0	10.5
	Peasant Party (1918- 1926)	0.0	2.6	0.0	19.0	22.6	4.0	5.5
	National Peasant Party (1926-1947)	0.0	8.4	6.5	26.2	64.2	10.7	14.3
	Agrarian Party (1929- 1938)	0.0	1.9	0.0	7.1	7.5	1.3	2.3
	National Agrarian Party (1932-1935)	0.0	2.6	1.6	14.3	3.8	10.7	4.3
	National Christian Party (1935-1938)	0.0	2.6	1.6	9.5	5.7	20.0	5.5
	Small nationalist parties	0.0	1.9	0.0	2.4	1.9	0.0	1.0
	Archangel Michael's Legion (fascists - 1927- 1941)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.3	1.4
	Carol the 2nd's supportive political factions (1938-1940)	0.0	7.7	0.0	19.0	35.8	21.3	11.3
	Diplomats	5.9	1.9	1.6	0.0	5.7	1.3	2.9

***Divisions of the Political Elites***

Portfolios	Prime Minister	23.8	11.6	8.1	9.5	13.2	14.7	14.1
	Vice Prime Minister	0.0	1.9	1.6	2.4	1.9	0.0	1.2
	Minister of state / Minister without portfolio	0.0	11.0	8.1	45.2	17.0	2.7	10.7
	Internal Affairs	25.7	25.8	11.3	16.7	13.2	10.7	19.5
	Foreign Affairs	34.7	19.4	6.5	2.4	5.7	6.7	16.0
	Finances	32.7	14.8	9.7	7.1	22.6	9.3	17.2
	Justice	28.7	27.1	3.2	11.9	7.5	6.7	17.8
	War / Defence	10.9	5.2	77.4	0.0	5.7	9.3	15.8
	Education	0.0	3.9	0.0	4.8	15.1	10.7	4.9
	Cults, Arts	32.7	18.1	3.2	23.8	0.0	12.0	16.8
	Public Works	20.8	21.3	11.3	19.0	11.3	6.7	16.4
	Agriculture	4.0	19.4	4.8	14.3	26.4	6.7	12.7
	Industry and Trade	0.0	16.1	6.5	14.3	17.0	6.7	10.0
	Communications	0.0	1.9	8.1	2.4	1.9	0.0	2.0
	Health	0.0	1.9	0.0	7.1	5.7	8.0	3.1
	Labour, Social welfare	0.0	6.5	0.0	14.3	11.3	5.3	5.3
	National Economy	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	3.8	8.0	2.0
	Propaganda, press, information	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	3.8	5.3	1.6
	Minorities	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.2
	Financial control	11.9	0.0	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.7
Foreign Trade	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	1.9	1.3	0.6	
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
N =	101	155	62	42	53	75	488	

MARIANA HAUSLEITNER

## Minorities and Sociopolitical Crises in Three Regional Societies: Bukovina, Bessarabia, and Transylvania-Banat (1918–1944)

The way in which the rights of minorities are secured by a given state says much about the political structures of that state. While the Romanian state of the interwar era possessed all the institutions suitable for a democracy, their operational competence was often limited. The regions bordering the Soviet Union were almost constantly under martial law. Because of this the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the population were not respected and especially members of ethnic minorities were subject to the arbitrariness of the military administration. The state security police even made distinctions in the application of censorship and the restriction on the right of assembly between the different minority groups: It viewed the Germans before 1933 as loyal to the Romanian state, while the Hungarians and the Ukrainians were – collectively – accused of irredentism. In the case of the Jews, it was assumed that they were holding communist sympathies, even when in fact the state security police was dealing with social democrats or Zionists. I will use the descriptions from the documents of the security authorities as a starting point and not as factual evidence – as it is often done by historians in Romania and the Republic of Moldova.<sup>1</sup> I will complement these with an analysis of newspaper articles of the time and memoirs of members of ethnic minorities. In the case of the Bukovina I will make use of interviews with people who have been contemporary to the time under scrutiny.<sup>2</sup>

In the following, I will present my research on Bukovina and Bessarabia as well as on Southern Transylvania (the Banat region). However, since my research on the first two regions is already completed, while my project on the latter has just begun, my presentation on Bukovina and Bessarabia will be drawing on a much wider array of findings. The results of my research in relation to these two areas can be very helpful to students working on the situation of the ethnic minorities in Transylvania, especially in order to elaborate the specificity of Romanianization measures in this region. Among

1 For example: Anatol Petrencu, *România și Basarabia în anii celui de-al doilea război mondial* [Romania and Bessarabia in the years of World War II] (Chișinău: Epigraf 1999), 35; Dumitru Șandru, *Mișcări de populație în România 1940-1948* [Population dynamics in Romania, 1940–1948] (București: Editura Enciclopedică 2003), 225–236.

2 Interviews with Jews in the Ukraine: “*Czernowitz s gewen an alte jidische Schtot...*” *Überlebende berichten* (Berlin: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 1999) and with Bukovinian Jews in Israel: *Zwischen Jordan und Pruth. Lebenserinnerungen Czernowitzer Juden.* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2003).

the strongest parallels to be found is probably that between the situation of the Hungarians and the Ukrainians in the Bukovina – the representatives of the latter starting to reconcile themselves to the idea of being a minority within Romania only in the middle of the 1920s. Among both ethnic groups irredentist activists gained ground after the middle of the 1930s due to the limited concessions made to them in the cultural sphere.

## **Bukovina**

In my habilitation thesis I have analyzed the implications of the Romanianization policies in Bukovina in the time between 1918 and 1944. What was happening in the 1920s can be seen as a frontal assault on the cultural capital (following Bourdieu) of non-Romanians.<sup>3</sup> Given the immediate introduction of Romanian as the only administrative language, it was possible to sack many of the civil servants in the administration and the judiciary of the region. Many of the state-run high schools, where the language of education was not Romanian, were closed down. This affected mainly the Ukrainians and the Germans, while many Jews were able to send their children to private schools.<sup>4</sup> The law of 1925 then also affected the private schools and resulted in the first main conflict in Chernowitz. Some of the Jewish high school students, who failed their final exams because of the examination style of a Romanian teacher, confronted him and were subsequently arrested because of this. During their trial in 1926 a Romanian nationalist assassinated the Jewish high school student David Fallik. The Romanian Minister of the Interior applauded the deed and the assassin was acquitted.<sup>5</sup> However, it has to be noted that the assassin was not from Bukovina. Until the mid-thirties the student associations of the far right remained fairly weak and less radical here than their counterparts in the other provinces. A reason for this was that until then the Romanian university graduates in Chernowitz were in no pain of finding lucrative posts after leaving university. Following the assassination of Fallik, the National Peasant Party government made some concessions as to the educational use of mother tongues by the minorities. Many Ukrainian schools were closed after 1930, when – due to the economic depression – public funds were not even sufficient to pay Romanian teachers.<sup>6</sup>

We can place the beginning of the second phase at the end of 1933 when the National Liberals came to power and nullified the concessions the National

3 For this concept see Pierre Bourdieu, “Ökonomisches Kapital, kulturelles Kapital, soziales Kapital”, in *Soziale Ungleichheiten*, ed. Reinhard Kreckel (Göttingen: Schwartz Verlag, 1983), 183–198.

4 Mariana Hausleitner, *Deutsche und Juden in Bessarabien 1814–1941. Zur Minderheitenpolitik Russlands und Großrumäniens* (Munich: IKGS, 2005), 159–163. See also: Irina Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania. Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle 1918–1930* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 76.

5 Hausleitner, *Die Rumänisierung*, 166–167. See also: Lya Benjamin, “Paradigma Falik-Totu sau cum s-a transformat un fapt cotidian într-un caz de asasinat politic”, [The Falik-Totu paradigm, or how did an ordinary event become transformed into a case of political assassination] in *Studia et Acta Historiae Iudaeorum Romaniae* (București: Editura Hasefer, 1997), 187–200, 190.

6 Hausleitner, *Die Rumänisierung*, 267. See also: Arkadij Zhukovskij, *Istoriya Bukovyny*, vol. 2 (Chernivci: Vidavnicha Spilka Chas, 1993), 128.

Peasant Party had previously made. The 1934 law on the reduction of the proportion of non-Romanian employees in industrial enterprises represented a new degree of discrimination: the interference in the private sector of the economy.<sup>7</sup> Jewish entrepreneurs were notably forced to sack Jewish employees. Although the German minority was also to be affected by this law, the Berlin Ambassador successfully intervened on their behalf. The intervention of Jewish organizations from Great Britain and France was on the contrary to no avail. Following the process of deprivation of civic rights, until 1939 about a third of the Jews of Bukovina had even lost their Romanian citizenship.<sup>8</sup> The anti-Jewish measures were legitimized by arguing that the Jews had supposedly ousted the Romanian middle class, which in turn was now in need of supportive measures by the state.<sup>9</sup>

The third phase in the forties is marked by the attempt to make the territory of Romania ethnically homogenous. The first two steps in this direction were not initiated by the Romanian government. After the Romanian administration had to leave Bessarabia and the northern part of the Bukovina due to the Soviet ultimatum of June 1940, the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle/ VOMI* (Bureau for the Ethnic Germans Abroad) took the initiative of having all Germans resettled out of this territory.<sup>10</sup> Because of the beginning repressions, Ukrainians and Romanians also applied for resettlement to the German Reich and altogether 30,000 applicants were refused because of their “insufficient Germanness” (*unzureichende Deutschstämmigkeit*).<sup>11</sup> Among the 43,000 re-settlers, however, there were approximately 4,000 especially endangered Romanians and Ukrainians.<sup>12</sup>

With reference to kinship, the VOMI applied for the resettlement of the Germans from the southern, Romanian part of the *Buchenland* (as the Bukovina was called within the prescribed phraseology of the Third Reich) as well as the Dobrudja. Even though these territories were not threatened by the NKVD, 52,400 people left southern Bukovina.<sup>13</sup> In the northern part of Bukovina tens of thousands of Romanians, Jews, and Ukrainians were deported to Siberia within the one year of Soviet rule in 1940/41 – the exact number, however, is not yet known. Some of the survivors published accounts on the conditions

7 Hausleitner, *Die Rumänisierung*, 230–231. See also: Dietmar Müller, *Staatsbürger auf Widerruf. Juden und Muslime als Alteritätspartner im rumänischen und serbischen Nationscode. Ethnonationale Staatsbürgerschaftskonzepte 1878–1941* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2005), 400–402.

8 Joshua Starr, “Jewish Citizenship in Rumania 1878–1940”, *Jewish Social Studies*, 3 (January 1941): 57–80, 79.

9 Iosif Maior, *Problema romanizării economiei naționale* [The problem of the romanianization of the national economy] (București: Lumina română, 1940), 105, 112.

10 Valdis Lumans, *Himmler's Auxiliaries. The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe 1933–1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 112.

11 Hausleitner, *Die Rumänisierung*, 362. See also: Zhukovskij, *Istorija*, 177.

12 Dirk Jachomowski, *Die Umsiedlung der Bessarabien-, Bukowina und Dobrudschadeutschen. Von der Volksgruppe in Rumänien zur “Siedlungsbrücke” an der Reichsgrenze* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg-Verlag 1984), 74.

13 Jachomowski, *Die Umsiedlung*, 88–95.

under which a great part of the deportees died due to malnutrition and related illnesses.<sup>14</sup>

The Jews who had not been deported faced an especially hard time in the wake of the reoccupation of northern Bukovina in July 1941 by Romania. They were to be deported to the new Romanian occupied territory of Transnistria. Ion Antonescu accused them of collaboration with the communists.<sup>15</sup> Yet, it was all about a much grander program of ethnic “homogenization” through which 3.5 million non-Romanians were to be exchanged for Romanian populations in Hungary and the former Yugoslavia, or to be expelled. In October of 1941, Sabin Manuilă, Director of the Central Institute for Statistics, presented a plan envisaging multiple phases for the realization of this. Members of his staff had registered scattered Romanian populations in the territory of the Soviet Union, which were to be resettled in Bessarabia.<sup>16</sup> In turn, more than a million Ukrainians and Russians from Bessarabia and Bukovina were to be expelled to Transnistria.<sup>17</sup> Their expulsion was scheduled for 1943 and could not materialize merely because developments on the Eastern Front did not allow it.

When the department for “Romanianization” was preparing for the expulsion of the Ukrainians in 1941, the theories of the historian Ion Nistor were used as a legitimization. His writings make a good case study for tracing the process of radicalization in the minority policies of Romania: He was also a prominent politician in Bukovina after 1918 and, since 1934, also in leading positions of various government departments. In the 1920s, he had justified measures aimed against the minorities by arguing that many Romanians had lost their identity in previous times due to the “infiltration” of Ukrainians. This “lost identity” had to be regained now. In addition, he argued that the results of a previous “Germanization” also had to be nullified – this serving as a justification why Jews were no longer allowed to attend German schools. Already in 1934, the idea that the Ukrainians could be exchanged for the Romanians of Transnistria surfaced in his writings.<sup>18</sup> However, the Soviet

14 Margit Bartfeld-Feller, *Am östlichen Fenster. Gesammelte Geschichten aus Czernowitz und aus der sibirischen Verbannung* (Konstanz: Hartung-Gorre Verlag, 2002); Julius Wolfenhaut, *Nach Sibirien verbannt. Als Jude von Czernowitz nach Stalinka 1941–1994* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005).

15 Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania. The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies Under the Antonescu Regime 1940-1944* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000), 115–175.

16 Anton Rațiu, *Românii de la est de Bug* [The Romanians from the east of Bug] (București: Editura Fundației Culturale Române, 1994), 29, 33 and 55; Rodica Solovei, *Activitatea Guvernământului Transnistriei în domeniul social-economic și cultural (19 august 1941-29 ianuarie 1944)* [The activity of Transnistria's government in the social, economic and cultural domains, August 19, 1941 January 29, 1944] (Iași: Demiurg, 2004), 93.

17 Viorel Achim, “The Romanian Population Exchange Project Elaborated by Sabin Manuilă in October 1941”, in *Annali dell'Istituto storico italo-germanico in Trento, XXVII* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2001), 595–617, 616–617.

18 Ion Nistor, *Problema ucraineană în lumina istoriei* [The Ukrainian problem in the light of history] (Cernăuți, 1934, reprinted, Rădăuți: Editura Septentrion, 1997), 77, 225.

Union was not interested in such an exchange. After June 1941, Nistor justified the conquest of Transnistria as the liberation of local Romanians.<sup>19</sup>

Parallel to my analysis of the governmental policies, I also examined the positions of the organizations of the non-Romanians and found that in Bukovina the representatives of Germans, Jews and Ukrainians acted united against the Romanianization of their schools until 1928. This cooperation was sustained by the fact that the social-democratic deputy of Chernowitz, Jakob Pistiner also supported the common cause of all ethnic groups.<sup>20</sup> After 1933, the representatives of the non-Romanians seldomly acted in unison. This had many reasons. The deterioration of the relations between Germans and Jews is generally attributed to the influence of national-socialist ideas on the German minority. The influence became especially visible when in 1933 Jewish organizations called for a boycott of German products in order to draw attention to the persecution of Jews in the German Reich. Representatives of the German minority claimed that this was atrocity propaganda and in turn called for a boycott of the three daily newspapers published by Jews in Chernowitz.<sup>21</sup> Within the Ukrainian minority population a process of radicalization also started at that time: The moderate minority leaders were marginalized by forces on the political right calling for a greater Ukrainian state.<sup>22</sup> The fact that the Germans and the Ukrainians did not see themselves as members of minority groups but as part of external nations was in my view mainly the result of the failed negotiations about concessions from the National Liberal Party government. The Jewish candidates, who had run on the ballot of Romanian parties until 1931 and started then a separate Jewish list, remained isolated after 1933. Many of the adolescent Jews saw a future only in Palestine or the Soviet Union.<sup>23</sup>

In order to establish what kind of influence the organizations of non-Romanians actually exerted, I have not only examined their publications, but also studied the files of the security police, Siguranța, on a regional level. These are almost completely present at the regional archive of Chernowitz. By comparing them with the dossiers of the central government agencies in Bucharest, I was able to determine which measures were initiated by the Bucharest center and which by the regional elites. Until the mid-twenties endeavors to marginalize the minorities were carried out by local Romanian

19 Ion Nistor, "De ce luptăm dincolo de Nistru?" [Why do we fight beyond the Nistru] *Bucovina* 72, no. 1 (October 4, 1941). See also Mariana Hausleitner, "Ethische Homogenisierung als Prinzip der Bevölkerungspolitik? Das Beispiel der Bukowina 1918–1944", in *Migration in südöstlichen Mitteleuropa. Auswanderung, Flucht, Deportation, Exil im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Krista Zach (Munich: IKGS-Verlag, 2005), 135–154, 137–141.

20 Hausleitner, *Die Rumänisierung*, 201–204.

21 Hausleitner, *Die Rumänisierung*, 275–291. Also: Hildrun Glass, *Zerbrochene Nachbarschaft. Das deutsch-jüdische Verhältnis in Rumänien 1918-1938* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg-Verlag, 1996), 357–381.

22 Hausleitner, *Die Rumänisierung*, 266–275. See also: Frank Golczewski, "Die ukrainische Emigration", in *Geschichte der Ukraine*, ed. Frank Golczewski (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), 237.

23 Hausleitner, *Die Rumänisierung*, 291–301. See also: Carol Iancu, *Evreii din România 1919-1938. De la emancipare la marginalizare* (București: Editura Humanitas, 2000), 228.

leaders; it was only afterwards that the Bucharest ministries took direct initiatives to deprive the minorities of power through legal means.

## **Bessarabia**

In the case of Bessarabia I have mainly investigated the situation of Germans and Jews in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century on the basis of the dossiers of the state archives in Chişinău and in Bucharest. I will limit here my presentation to those aspects of the interwar years which differ markedly from the situation in Bukovina and Transylvania.

The extent of violence experienced through the hands of the state by minorities was already much larger in Bessarabia than in other parts of the country. The Romanian army killed hundreds of Ukrainians during the uprisings of Hotin and Bender in 1919 as well as the one of Tatar Bunar in 1924. Such massacres only took place in this territory, where the military administration was able to point to the infiltration by Bolsheviks. While this did take place, it found support with some farmers because the land reform had not satisfied their hopes.<sup>24</sup> Ever since the *Entente* had embarked upon the policy of the *cordon sanitaire* around the Soviet state, only some politically engaged authors such as Henri Barbusse, or organizations on the political left took up the topic of repression in these regions.<sup>25</sup>

In Bukovina, in contrast to Bessarabia, social democracy was already well established by the beginning of the 1920s so as to channel social protest institutionally. In Bessarabia, however, all political organizations of the left had been crushed after 1918. Of the Jewish Workers' Union (*Allgemeiner Jüdischer Arbeiterbund in Rumänien* or *Bund*, by its popular name) only its cultural section (*Kulturliche*) remained still active. Its support for Yiddish language schools, however, was prosecuted as if it represented an act of high treason. The police tried to lock away well-known Bundists as Bolsheviks.<sup>26</sup> Yet, just a small number of communists were working underground and were trying to reach the minorities with separatist demands.<sup>27</sup>

24 Mariana Hausleitner, *Deutsche und Juden in Bessarabien 1814-1941. Zur Minderheitenpolitik Russlands und Großrumäniens* (Munich: IKGS, 2005), 90-98. The French consul in Chişinău wrote in 1924 that much more than 300 people – which were the official number – had been executed. See Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu and Ion Pătroiu, eds., *Documente străine despre Basarabia și Bucovina 1918-1944* [Foreign documents about Bessarabia and Bukovina, 1918-1944] (Bucureşti: Editura Vremea, 2003), 54, 62.

25 Henri Barbusse, *Die Henker* (Stuttgart: Verlag Öffentliches Leben, 1927), 120-121. About the Cordon sanitaire: Dan Diner, *Das Jahrhundert verstehen. Eine universalhistorische Deutung* (Munich: Luchterhand, 1999), 99.

26 For example the trial against Hersch Gilischenski in 1921. See: Hausleitner, *Deutsche*, 121-123; and Joseph Kissman, "Zur Geschichte der jüdischen Arbeiterbewegung 'Bund' in der Bukowina", in *Geschichte der Juden in der Bukowina*, vol. 1, ed. Hugo Gold (Tel Aviv: Olamenu, 1958), 138-142.

27 Hausleitner, *Deutsche*, 123. See Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Stalinism for All Seasons. A Political History of Romanian Communism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 52-56.

Much more successful than in other provinces were the cooperatives, which in Bessarabia were sponsored by the “Jewish Colonization Association”. The amount of financial aid from Jewish organizations pouring into Bessarabia was second only to that earmarked for Palestine. In 1930 the Union of Jewish Cooperatives reached a membership of 30.657. Taking into account that every head of household had to provide for four other persons on average, one can estimate that more than half of the Bessarabian Jewry was affiliated with the cooperative network. The members of the credit unions belonged to the following professions: 42% small businessmen, 24% craftsmen, 12% farmers and the rest others. Until the world economic crisis the Union was able to successfully combat poverty, but afterwards there was a slump in membership. Many members were not able to repay their credits. In addition, the support from abroad was also reduced.<sup>28</sup>

Until the mid-thirties, Zionists as well as Bundists were working together in the Association’s higher ranks. After 1935 a strong polarization occurred. At that time, Chief Rabbi Zirelsohn, who was also a senator, was denouncing as Communists his former colleagues of the 1933/1934 campaign for the boycott of German products. The members of the anti-fascist committee were prosecuted as sympathizers of the Soviet Union. Many of them stayed in prison until June 1940, when they were released due to the evacuation of the Romanian administration.<sup>29</sup>

Unlike in Bukovina, where the representatives of the Jews and the Germans were in constant communication, in Bessarabia there was very little cooperation among them even before 1933. This had many reasons: the majority of the Germans lived quite isolated in rural structures in the South, while the Jews were overwhelmingly living in the North. There was no common forum like the one that the three German daily newspapers were providing for in Chernowitz. In Bessarabia, the Jews were reading Yiddish or Russian newspapers and the Germans only their more regionally oriented press. Most of the German schools had been nationalized by the state in 1918. Now the leaders of the German minority were working towards the establishment of confessional schools in order to evade the state’s drive for Romanianization.<sup>30</sup> Many Jewish children were attending private schools and therefore the representatives of the Jews were only protesting against the pressure on their schools when it increased after 1925. After the early 1930s, the Jews of Bessarabia were not the only group acting without dialogue with other minorities.

Also within the German minority there was a strong trend of radicalization – much stronger than in Bukovina. It was only in Bessarabia that thousands of Germans started attending the rallies of the anti-Semitic Party of Alexandru C.

28 Hausleitner, *Deutsche*, 116–117. Also: Keith Hitchins, “Jewish Credit Cooperatives in Bessarabia and Integration 1920–1940”, in *The Jews in the Romanian History*, ed. Ion Stanciu (București: Editura Silex, 1997), 193–200, 195–196.

29 Hausleitner, *Deutsche*, 128–138.

30 Hausleitner, *Deutsche*, 144–148.

Cuza since 1935.<sup>31</sup> In Bukovina, Cuza's party had only a small following among Germans. Even though a radicalization did take place among many Germans in Bessarabia, the functionaries in the Reich were of the opinion in 1940 that they had no strong aversion to Jews.<sup>32</sup>

The last phase of "ethnic homogenization" took place in parallel to the events in northern Bukovina. Yet, while the Romanian mayor of Chernowitz Traian Popovici, successfully appealed on behalf of the Jewish population, thus enabling 20,000 Jews to stay in the city, there was no such an advocate for the Jews in Bessarabia. Only some richer Jews were allowed to emigrate to Palestine, while approximately 200,000 others were deported to Transnistria, where more than one third of them perished.<sup>33</sup> Those Jews who remained in Chernowitz later founded charitable institutions. Of their Bessarabian coreligionists there was nobody left to follow suit.

### **Southern Transylvania and the Serbian Banat**

Within my new project I am investigating the situation of "ethnic Germans" – the so called *Volksdeutsche* – in the Romanian and Serbian Banat region in the 1940s. So far historians have been concentrating either exclusively on the German minority until 1944 or their persecution afterwards. My research will focus on two questions: Was the difference in behavior of the ethnic Germans in Romania and Yugoslavia in the war years solely determined by the different external circumstances concerning both countries, or had there been already different developments during the interwar period?

The Germans in Romania as well as in Yugoslavia had successively come under the control of the *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle/VOMI*, which was sponsoring their organizations. However, the nature of their subordination to this bureau was to be very different in the war years.

The Swabians in the Romanian Banat constituted mostly a conservative peasant population and only some leaders were preparing various plans for possibly turning the region into a *Reichsgau* (department of the Reich).<sup>34</sup> For

31 Hausleitner, *Deutsche*, 151–161. See also: Viorica Nicolenco, *Extrema dreaptă în Basarabia 1923–1940* [The extreme right in Bessarabia, 1923–1940] (Chişinău: Editura Civitas, 1999), 56, 69.

32 Ute Schmidt, *Die Deutschen aus Bessarabien. Eine Minderheit aus Südosteuropa (1814 bis heute)* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2003), 82, see also footnote 12.

33 Hausleitner, *Deutsche*, 182–188. For the number of Jews who were murdered or died in Transnistria see Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania. The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies Under the Antonescu Regime 1940–1944* (Chicago: Ivan R Dee, 2000), 289. The International Commission on the Romanian Holocaust established the number of victims from Bukovina, Bessarabia, and Transnistria between 280,000 and 380,000. See: "Report on the Holocaust in Romania. Executive Summary", www.yadvashem.org (accessed December 20, 2006). This estimation is also taken up in a new schoolbook: Florin Petrescu, *Istoria evreilor. Holocaustul. Manual pentru liceu*. [The history of the Jews. The Holocaust. Textbook for highschools] (Bucureşti: Editura didactică şi pedagogică 2005), 101.

34 Jachomowski mention plans to transfer 35,000 Swabians from Sathmar to the Banat in November 1939. See Jachomowski, *Die Umsiedlung*, 50. Also in April 1941, Triska from Auswärtiges Amt wrote about this idea. See: Theodor Schieder, ed., *Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien*, 2nd ed. (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984), 78.

this reason, the Romanian security forces were watching them with heightened suspicion. Because Romanians dominated the administration of the region, the Germans had benefited from the expropriation of Jewish property only to a small extent. They actually received three enterprises only.<sup>35</sup>

Furthermore, not all the Swabians served in the military units of the German Reich. Some chose to enter the Romanian military. When the Soviet army advanced in September 1944, some resisted evacuation to Germany by VOMI officials. In seven identified cases such persons were killed by their fellow Swabians.<sup>36</sup>

53,000 Swabians of the Romanian Banat were deported in January 1945 to the Soviet Union for forced labor, where a quarter of them died. All Swabians lost their property. Yet, there was only rarely any violence against them by their non-German neighbors.<sup>37</sup>

In the Serbian Banat, which had been under German occupation since April 1941, the Swabians received important posts in the civil administration: Sepp Lapp was appointed *Vizebanus*, the second leading position in the region. Therefore, they were able to take part in the aryanization measures. Some of them took personal profit from the expropriations that followed and were searched by the *Rechnungshof* in 1942/43.<sup>38</sup> After the extermination of all 4,200 Jews of the Banat, the German spouses of Jews were handed over to the VOMI. After a selection by the leader of the *Volksgruppe*, Sepp Janko, they were sent to do forced labor in Germany.<sup>39</sup>

Many Serbs who had previously received land in Swabian villages were expropriated in the war years. That is why many of these former settlers supported the partisans and why the retributive actions were generally directed at them. All Serbians had to do forced labor and work on the farms of the ethnic Germans or in their enterprises. Only the Roma did not have to do forced labor. Some of them were even shot, when not enough other victims for

35 Johann Böhm, *Die Gleichschaltung der deutschen Volksgruppe in Rumänien und das "Dritte Reich" 1941-1944* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2003), 100.

36 Hans Ewald Frauenhoffer, *Erinnerungen und Erlebnisse eines "Volksparteilers" aus der Zeit des Kampfes um die nationale Erneuerung des Banater Deutschtums* (Gerlingen: Selbstverlag, 1975), 532–538; Georg Hromadka, *Kleine Chronik des Banater Berglandes* (Munich: Südostdeutsches Kulturwerk, 1993), 108.

37 For the number see: Ingomar Senz, *Die Donauschwaben* (Munich: Langen Müller, 1994), 137–138. For the political circumstances: Hannelore Baier, *Germanii din România 1944–1956* [The Germans from Romania, 1944–1956] (Sibiu: Editura Honterus, 2005), 10.

38 Ekkehard Völkl, *Der Westbanat 1941–1944. Die deutsche, die ungarische und andere Volksgruppen*, (Munich: Trofenik/ Ungarisches Institut, 1991), 170–180.

39 About the killings of these Jews see: Walter Manoschek, "Serbien ist judenfrei". *Militärische Besatzungspolitik und Judenvernichtung in Serbien 1941/42* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1993), 91–96; Holm Sundhaussen, "Jugoslawien", in *Dimension des Völkermords. Die Zahl der jüdischen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus*, 2nd ed., ed. Wolfgang Benz (Munich: Deutscher TaschenbuchVerlag, 1996), 313. About the part of Janko see: Akiko Shimizu, *Die deutsche Okkupation des serbischen Banats 1941-1944 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutschen Volksgruppe in Jugoslawien* (Münster: Lit-Verlag, 2003), 300.

executions could be found.<sup>40</sup> In the course of retributive actions following partisan attacks, the *volksdeutsche Polizei* (ethnic German police forces) arrested many Serbians, often whole families including children. The *Staatswache* (state security police), which consisted mainly of ethnic Germans, was subordinated to an ethnic German prefect. He used the *Deutsche Mannschaft*, which all men from 17 to 40 years had to join, for making arrests as well as serving as guards in concentration camps.<sup>41</sup> In some cases the *Deutsche Mannschaft* was involved in executions of presumptive partisans which demonstratively took place in villages with a Serbian majority.<sup>42</sup> The ethnic Germans were killing so many Serbians in retributive actions that in August 1943 even the special envoy of the German foreign office, Neubacher, intervened to the effect that the ethnic German prefect of the police, August Meyszner was soon afterwards replaced.<sup>43</sup>

Because of the involvement of the Swabians from the Serbian Banat in the ethnic cleansing, their relationship with their immediate neighbors deteriorated. After 1943 this was also the case for relations with their neighbors in the wider regional setting. Since 1942, ethnic Germans were fighting in the SS-Gebirgsdivision "Prince Eugen", which was organized by a Saxon from Transylvania, General Arthur Phleps. This unit was deployed in the other regions of Yugoslavia in order to fight the partisans. In summer 1943 they were engaged against Tito's partisans in Herzegovina and Montenegro, where 10,000 partisans were killed.<sup>44</sup> In this time the "Prince Eugen" division had 20,000 members, after the retreat in October 1944 only 4.000 survived.<sup>45</sup>

In this project I am examining if there was a direct connection between the violent relationship in the war years and the especially violent persecution of the German minority of Yugoslavia after 1944. The leaders of the Titoist partisans decided in April 1944 to exclude from all civic rights persons who had served in the armed forces of the enemy.<sup>46</sup> The results of this decision concerned not only Swabians but also Italians, Croats, and some Serbs.<sup>47</sup>

The internment of all ethnic Germans was a result of the decisions adopted by the Liberation Front (AVNOJ) on November 21, 1944, which also included

40 Raul Hilberg, *Die Vernichtung der europäischen Juden*, 2nd ed., vol. 2, (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1990), 733.

41 Shimizu, *Die deutsche Okkupation*, 196, 247.

42 Shimizu, *Die deutsche Okkupation*, 326–327.

43 Hermann Neubacher, *Sonderauftrag Südost 1940–45. Bericht eines fliegenden Diplomaten* (Göttingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1956), 143–144.

44 Thomas Casagrande, *Die volksdeutsche SS-Division "Prinz Eugen"* (Frankfurt: Campus-Verlag, 2003), 254.

45 Anna M. Wittmann and Friedrich Umbrich, "Annex", in *Alpträum Balkan. Ein siebenbürgischer Bauernsohn im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1943-1945* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2003), 315.

46 *Documentation Project Committee: Genocide of the Ethnic Germans in Yugoslavia 1944-1948* (Munich: Verlag der Donauschwäbischen Kulturstiftung, 2003), 43.

47 Zoran Ziletić, "Die Geschichte der Donauschwaben in der Wojwodina. Zu ihrer Darstellung in Serbien und Deutschland", in *Die Deutschen in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa*, vol. 2, ed. Gerhard Grimm and Krista Zach (Munich: Verlag Südostdeutsches Kulturwerk 1996), 223–236, 232.

the global expropriation of ethnic Germans in the framework of the confiscation of enemy property. The law on citizenship of August 23, 1945 stipulated that certain categories of Germans could be deprived of their Yugoslav citizenship.<sup>48</sup>

The VOMI started too late the evacuation of the Swabians from the Yugoslav Banat. Immediately after the arrival of the Red Army in October 1944 groups of partisans started to loot on large scale. The number of Swabians killed before any internment measure is estimated between 8,000 and 10,000. Around 40,000 were deported to the Soviet Union and the others had to do forced labor in the region.<sup>49</sup> Even children had to stay two years in concentration camps, where 25,740 starved to death.<sup>50</sup>

The conditions the ethnic Germans faced in the camps and at the sites of forced labor in Yugoslavia and Romania differed greatly. I am examining to what extent the maltreatment of the Swabians in the Serbian Banat was carried out by the very people who had suffered especially hard at the hands of the Germans during the war years. Or, if it was rather the fact that the Swabians had lost all their rights, so as to encourage their maltreatment and occasional murder. Were there any real investigations and legal procedures during the trials against Germans after 1944 or are they to be seen merely as show trials? At this moment I am establishing the adequate case studies for a focus on some villages, thanks to archival sources of at German Ministry of the Exterior.

In conclusion I would like to highlight the aim of my project. I want to show how governmental policies shaped the behavior of minorities. Radical forces began to dominate either when preceding political negotiations did not lead to visible results, or when there were considerable outside influences financially supported from abroad. In peace time radicalization only led to racial segregation and occasional attacks on minority members. During the war years however, the results were fatal. With the example of the Swabians in the Romanian and Serbian Banat region, one can illustrate why in spite of a similar history and comparable social structures the two groups were taking part in crimes in very different degrees between 1941 and 1944. While, within the Romanian state, the beneficiaries of the expropriation of Jews were mostly Romanians, in the Serbian Banat some Swabians also took part in the persecution and plundering of their Jewish and Serbian neighbors.

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48 Zoran Janjetović, *Between Hitler and Tito. The Disappearance of the Vojvodina Germans*, author's 2nd ed. (Belgrade: 2005), 227.

49 Ingomar Senz, *Die Donauschwaben* (Munich: Langen Müller, 1994), 129-130; Janjetović, *Between Hitler*, 329.

50 Janjetović, *Between Hitler*, 329; Hans-Werner Schuster and Walther Konschitzky, eds. *Deportation der Südostdeutschen in die Sowjetunion 1945-1949* (Munich: Haus des Deutschen Osten, 1999), 65.